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INTRODUCTION
Certain constitutional rights are intricately bound up with, and in some
cases critically dependent upon, access to and enjoyment of public properties. This is true in a variety of constitutional contexts. For example, one
of the distinct lessons of the civil rights era was that constitutional equality
*

Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I would like to thank Nelson Tebbe for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank my colleague, William Van Alstyne, for
sparking my interest in this topic and for sharing his insights concerning this and countless other constitutional law subjects.
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entails equal access to public properties and facilities.1 Similarly, First
Amendment anti-establishment principles require that officials operate and
maintain public places in a manner that is not perceived as endorsing,
through symbolic displays or otherwise, particular religious sects or sectarianism.2 Anti-endorsement and antisectarianism ensure equality of enjoyment with respect to parks and other public properties. The First
Amendment’s free speech and free assembly guarantees also require that
access to at least some public properties be provided.3
Of course, the mere fact that public properties may facilitate constitutional liberties does not mean that officials have an obligation to make them
available or own them in perpetuity.4 Governments possess the organic
power to dispose of public assets. The Constitution does not generally constrain the choices private property owners might make in terms of equal access, religious displays, and expressive activity. Suppose, then, that the
government sells or otherwise conveys public property to a private owner or
simply closes a public facility such as a public park. Suppose further that,
after these dispositions, some members of the community remain deeply offended by a religious display that remains on the subject property or that
speakers continue to claim a right of access to what once was a traditional
public forum. Has disposition of the subject property necessarily settled or
extinguished their constitutional claims?
This question, which has recurred in various contexts since at least the
civil rights era, has never been systematically analyzed or definitively answered.5 Consider the following dispositions, or attempted dispositions, of
public property:

1

DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW 1836–1948 (1998) (highlighting the importance of
physical and experiential geography in the history of racial conflict by discussing the connections between space, power, experience, and the law leading up to and during the civil rights era).
2
See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612–21 (1989) (applying “endorsement”
test to religious displays on public property).
3
For a general discussion of the importance of public places to speech and assembly rights, see
TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES
(2009). For an analysis of the intersection of property rights and free speech in cases decided by the
Burger Court, see Norman Dorsen & Joel Gora, Free Speech, Property, and the Burger Court: Old Values, New Balances, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 195.
4
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1422–24 (1989)
(noting the discretionary nature of most government benefits).
5
Governments have always disposed of properties under broad grants of federal, state, and local
power. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (“Like any other owner
[Congress] may provide when, how and to whom its land can be sold.”). The extent to which these disposition powers are limited by constitutional rights was a question that frequently arose during the civil
rights era. See infra Part I.
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• Faced in the 1960s with the prospect of imminent, court-ordered desegregation of all of its municipal pools, a city council votes to close
all public pool facilities.6
• A Latin cross is located on a small patch of federal parkland in the
California desert. In response to a federal appeals court decision
holding that the display violates the Establishment Clause, Congress
conveys the property to a private landowner but retains a reversionary interest and an access easement with respect to the subject property.7
• To end a decades-long local controversy concerning a Latin cross
displayed on public property, Congress takes the parcel by eminent
domain.8
• A city sells a portion of Main Street to a private owner but retains an
easement on the property for pedestrian use. After a court invalidates certain expressive limits imposed on speakers using the easement, the city sells its remaining present interest in the property to a
religious organization but retains a reversionary interest.9
• In response to traffic and other public order problems stemming from
abortion protesters’ activity in a public cul-de-sac in front of an abortion clinic, city officials vacate a public pedestrian and parking
easement with respect to the cul-de-sac.10
In these and other circumstances, seemingly ordinary property dispositions—i.e., sales, leases, easements, assignments, dedications, vacations,
transfers, reversionary interests—have played a critical role in adjudicating
and purportedly settling constitutional claims. As the examples above
show, public officials have disposed of public properties to avoid constitutional litigation and, in some cases, to circumvent injunctive decrees. Property dispositions have also been used as a means of quelling public
controversy, freeing public officials and private owners from constitutional
fetters, and suppressing controversial speech.
As the first example indicates, the practice of what this Article calls
“settlement-by-disposition” has deep and varied roots tracing at least to the
civil rights era. Settlement-by-disposition has taken two principal forms.
6

See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218–19, 226 (1971) (holding that the city’s closing of all
public pools did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
7
See Salazar v. Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816 (2010) (holding that the district court erred
when it failed to address whether a land transfer statute violated the Establishment Clause).
8
See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that a federal taking of a memorial site resulting in the presence of a cross on federal property did not violate the
Establishment Clause).
9
See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding the city’s eventual divestment).
10
See Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195, 1202–03 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (invalidating the government’s vacation as impermissible destruction of a traditional public forum).
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Some property dispositions are responses to pending or imminent legal
claims or judicial mandates. The disposition serves as a purported settlement of the claims or court orders. Other dispositions may take place in the
absence of any pending or threatened legal action. However, when an access claim is brought, the government cites the property disposition as a
trump or settlement of any constitutional claims. In both instances, the disposition is claimed to have extinguished any constitutional claims or obligations. Settlements most often take the form of privatization of properties
and facilities, but as we shall see they can also result from public ownership
of formerly private property.
Although equality doctrine, antidiscrimination laws, and social norms
have essentially negated the use of property dispositions to effectuate racial
and other forms of segregation, property settlement has become increasingly common—and increasingly controversial—in some contemporary
First Amendment contexts.11 In several cases, officials faced with injunctions forbidding religious displays on public properties have sold or otherwise conveyed the parcel in question rather than remove the sectarian
symbols.12 Other means of property allocation, including federal takings of
local properties, have also been used to purportedly settle speech and establishment controversies.13 In public speech and assembly contexts, officials
have privatized and otherwise disposed of traditional public forum properties, including public sidewalks and streets. After these dispositions, governments and the new private owners have claimed that any First
Amendment difficulties have been settled or avoided.14
The practice of settlement-by-disposition raises fundamental constitutional questions. The dispositions examined in this Article represent far
more than mere sales, land swaps, or routine takings. They raise critical
questions about the nature of governmental power and responsibility, and
about the character of constitutional liberties. If officials can settle or extinguish constitutional claims through property dispositions, does this mean
that constitutional liberties that are intimately connected to public properties
are in an important sense merely discretionary? Does it mean, to quote a
recent Supreme Court decision involving the government’s power over federal territories, that officials may use their authority to “acquire, dispose of,

11

There are other contexts in which private law regimes also have been used to settle or address
constitutional obligations. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 70, 80–82 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/30/
LRColl2009n30Tebbe.pdf (questioning the propriety of using various private law property and contract
rules to manage or avoid constitutional constraints).
12
See, e.g., Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813; see also infra Part II.
13
See, e.g., Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1202; see also Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions
Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 69 MO. L. REV. 653, 655–62 (2004) (discussing the use of eminent domain in the context of adult establishments).
14
See infra Part III.
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and govern [public property]” in order to essentially “switch the Constitution on or off at will”?15
As noted, governments obviously have the power to sell or otherwise
convey public properties.16 Once they do so, it would seem that constitutional restrictions no longer apply to either the subject properties or their
new owners or possessors.17 As we shall see, however, the reality is much
more complicated. Since the civil rights era, courts have struggled to define
the limits of settlement-by-disposition. In many cases, courts have focused
primarily upon compliance with private property law principles to assess
the constitutionality of dispositions. Absent the most unusual circumstances, bona fide sales and other dispositions have been treated as legitimate resolutions of constitutional disputes relating to a public property.
Owing to the fact that the properties under consideration are public, however, many courts have not been comfortable relying solely on private property rules. Thus, at least some courts have acknowledged that formalistic
review of public property dispositions does not adequately protect against
the circumvention or evasion of public obligations and constitutional guarantees. Assessment of settlement-by-disposition has not proven susceptible
to easy answers or bright-line rules. Indeed neither courts nor commentators have offered any coherent framework for considering the legitimacy of
disposition as a means of constitutional settlement.
To better understand and articulate the constitutional boundaries of settlement-by-disposition, this Article examines the practice in three constitutional contexts: equality, establishment, and speech. Part I examines the
devises, leases, sales, and closures that formed an important part of the
massive resistance to desegregation from the 1950s to the early 1970s.
During the civil rights era, local and state officials frequently sought to engage in “circumvention-by-disposition” by using the mechanisms of private
property law to avoid equality obligations. Some courts thwarted these efforts by rejecting formalism, stretching state action principles, and assessing
official motives and purposes. But, wary of the implications of a broad
scale rejection of settlement-by-disposition, which included forcing localities or states to maintain public properties and facilities in perpetuity, other
courts, including the Supreme Court, upheld dispositions even though the
effect was circumvention of the equality guarantee. The civil rights era experience highlighted the fundamental tension between the government’s
power to dispose of public properties and the constitutional liberties that
depend upon access to those properties. Although courts adopted an approach that focused on the bona fides of each disposition, they never devel15

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915).
17
See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a commonplace that the
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or
state.”).
16
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oped a coherent framework for assessing the constitutional and democratic
legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition. Court decisions during the civil
rights era were understandably ad hoc and fact-specific; many were issued
in response to circumvention tactics by local officials. Owing in part to the
fact that equality doctrine was still in its infancy, courts tended to focus narrowly on the specific terms of a devise or sale rather than on officials’ public obligations with regard to the subject properties. Although they
invalidated some dispositions and questioned others, the courts ultimately
left the outer boundaries of settlement-by-disposition unsettled. They did
not, for example, rule on the constitutionality of closing the public schools
entirely in response to integration orders.18
As Part II shows, the fundamental tension between governmental ownership of certain properties and constitutional liberties has recently resurfaced in Establishment Clause controversies. Public officials increasingly
have turned to property disposition as a means of settling Establishment
Clause controversies. As did their predecessors in the civil rights context,
contemporary courts have attempted to distinguish between constitutionally
legitimate property settlements and sham circumventions. Courts generally
have purported to reject title formalism and to analyze both the form and
substance of dispositions. In truth, however, courts have placed few limits
on settlement-by-disposition. Only the most extraordinary circumstances
will rebut the operative presumption that property dispositions are valid
constitutional settlements. Moreover, as during the civil rights era, courts
have focused primarily on the specifics of the bidding process and private
property concerns, such as the retention of future interests, rather than on
the public obligations officials owe with respect to the subject properties.
In a few cases, officials have avoided establishment difficulties by taking or
publicizing property rather than privatizing it. Although such settlements
might be viewed as more democratically legitimate given the public obligations that apply in the takings context, as we shall see, there may be reasons
to question their legitimacy as well. Like all other powers, eminent domain
authority is limited by constitutional liberties. In sum, recent establishment
cases generally have been as ad hoc and private-law-focused as the civil
rights era disposition cases were. They have provided no overarching
framework for considering the constitutional and democratic validity of settlement-by-disposition.
Part III examines settlement-by-disposition in the First Amendment
speech and assembly context. The Supreme Court has never decided a case
involving the lease, sale, closure, or other disposition of a traditional public
forum. At the margins, the legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition in the
speech and assembly context would seem to be relatively clear. For example, as in other contexts, mere leases of public forum properties will not
automatically extinguish all constitutional claims. Moreover, officials pre18

See infra text accompanying notes 129–31.
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sumably cannot sell or otherwise dispose of public forum properties in a
purposeful effort to suppress certain speakers or speech. In other contexts,
however, courts have not offered a consistent and coherent framework for
assessing settlement-by-disposition. Some members of the Court have indicated that the First Amendment does not prohibit officials from selling,
physically altering, or otherwise disposing of traditional public forum properties.19 In apparent reliance on that understanding, some lower courts have
upheld dispositions so long as title formally passes to a private owner. As
in the equality and establishment contexts, however, other courts have
adopted a functional approach under which even some formally privatized
properties may remain subject to First Amendment speech and assembly
limitations. Courts using a functional approach, however, have not offered
any convincing justification for requiring officials and private owners to
consider First Amendment speech and assembly limitations despite the
formal transfer of title and ownership. Finally, as in the establishment context, governments have purported to settle free speech claims by publicizing
or adopting private property located in public fora. The government speech
doctrine has become a form of settlement-by-disposition that may reallocate
space and speech rights in public fora.
Part IV synthesizes the examination of settlement-by-disposition in the
equality, establishment, and speech contexts. In each context, the government’s power to dispose of properties conflicts with constitutional liberties
that are intricately intertwined with or affected by disposition of those properties. History and a close examination of the cases demonstrate that a simple rule either permitting or forbidding this particular form of
“workaround” or settlement in all cases is not viable.20 However, the ad hoc
approach that has prevailed since the civil rights era has failed to provide a
coherent framework for considering the constitutional and democratic legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition. Ultimately, the legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition should not turn narrowly on the specific terms of
conveyance, including possession of title, preservation of future interests,
the scope of access easements, and other private property matters. Governments are not typical property owners. The assets involved are not ordinary properties subject mainly to private property law rules. Rather, these
properties are critical constitutional assets. They are held subject to a public trust that imposes constitutional and democratic limits on their disposi19

See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699–700 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting that “in some sense” governments always retain the authority to sell or close a
public forum).
20
See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1503–04
(2009) (“Constitutional workarounds . . . occur only if the Constitution is in some sense at war with itself: One part of the text prohibits something, other parts of the text permit it, and the Constitution itself
does not appear to give either part priority over the other.” (footnotes omitted)). The proposed settlements examined in this Article are not technically “workarounds” as Tushnet defines that term, but they
do involve a similar tension between political pressures and constitutional commitments.
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tion.21 Pursuant to this trust, public officials owe fiduciary duties of fair
dealing, preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants. It is
these public obligations, rather than private law principles, that define the
constitutional boundaries of settlement-by-disposition. The trust obligations apply whether the disposition is accomplished through private property mechanisms or through invocation of public means such as takings.
Although courts ought to have the public trust duties in mind when reviewing settlement-by-disposition and deciding whether to enforce certain duties, the obligations apply whether or not courts are able or even asked to
enforce them. Ultimately, the public trust imposes upon public officials the
obligation to enter settlements that are constitutional in the sense that they
are based upon valid trust purposes, comply with judicial decrees, and respect minority rights.
I. EQUALITY AND CIRCUMVENTION-BY-DISPOSITION
Racial segregation was a massive and all-encompassing spatial enterprise.22 By law and local custom, people of color were separated from
whites across the municipal landscape. Places of recreation and repose, including public parks, were subject to de jure and de facto segregation.23
From the 1950s to the 1970s, equal access to public properties and facilities
was a central claim of civil rights advocates. Persons of color who could
not enjoy public schools, parks, swimming pools, and golf courses on an
equal basis with whites did not enjoy equal protection under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Premised on the fundamental right to equality,
Brown v. Board of Education24 was the first in a line of cases that started
with the desegregation of public schools but led to the extension of Brown’s
desegregation mandate to other public properties, including parks and
swimming pools.25 As discussed in this Part, rather than integrate these facilities, local and state officials frequently sought to extinguish equality
claims by selling, closing, or otherwise disposing of them. The judiciary
21

See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (observing that traditional
public fora are held in trust by government for the benefit of the people).
22
See DELANEY, supra note 1, at 96 (describing public and private racial segregation as “a process
of fanatical hyperterritoriality”).
23
A 1957 Montgomery, Alabama ordinance was typical. The ordinance made it a misdemeanor,
subject to fine and imprisonment, “for white and colored persons to enter upon, visit, use or in any way
occupy public parks or other public houses or public places, swimming pools, wadding [sic] pools,
beaches, lakes or ponds except those assigned to their respective races.” MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE
§ 21-57 (1957), quoted in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 558–59 (1974) (alteration in
original).
24
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court held that denial of access to critically important public school
facilities stigmatized students of color. See id. at 494.
25
See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 539 (1963) (enforcing injunction requiring
desegregation of public recreational facilities); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th
Cir. 1955) (ordering desegregation of public beaches and bathhouses), aff’d, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
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was thus squarely confronted with a conflict between local power to dispose
of public properties and civil liberties. The civil rights era was obviously a
unique period, and we ought not to extrapolate too broadly from the courts’
experience with settlement-by-disposition during this era. However, important lessons regarding the nature of constitutional liberties and the lawful
boundaries of settlement-by-disposition can be drawn from the courts’ first
sustained analysis of this practice.
A. Devise and Divestment—The Baconsfield Saga
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional limits of settlement-by-disposition in a pair of cases involving a devise under the will of
U.S. Senator Augustus O. Bacon.26 Since they represent the Court’s first
thorough consideration of settlement-by-disposition and establish the basic
contours of the debate, these cases are worth considering in some detail.
Senator Bacon had devised a tract of land in Macon, Georgia (Baconsfield) to the City of Macon and its mayor.27 According to the devise, the
land was to be used as “a park and pleasure ground” for white people only.28
If the city ever determined that it could not maintain Baconsfield as a segregated park, the property was to revert to Senator Bacon’s heirs.29 Baconsfield was to be maintained under the control of a seven-member board of
managers, each of whom was required to be white.30 Macon officials maintained the park as a segregated facility for many years, but, in time, blacks
were permitted to use the park.31 Members of the board filed suit, asking
that the city be removed as trustee.32 Over the constitutional objections of
several black individuals, the city resigned as trustee, seemingly divesting
itself of any involvement with the property.33 In order to prevent failure of
the trust, a Georgia court appointed three private individuals as new trustees.34 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the appointment.35
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held in Evans v.
Newton that the city’s resignation as trustee and the subsequent appointment of private trustees did not settle the Fourteenth Amendment claims.36
Given the city’s longstanding maintenance of the park and the tax exemption granted to it, the Court stated that the “momentum it acquired as a pub26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
Newton, 382 U.S. at 297.
Id.
Abney, 396 U.S. at 436.
Newton, 382 U.S. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 297–98.
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302.
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lic facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of ‘private’ trustees.”37 City officials, said the Court, continued to be “entwined”
in the management, maintenance, and control of the park.38 Thus, the mere
substitution of private trustees had not rendered the park a private facility.39
The Court went on to note that under the developing state action doctrine,
operating and maintaining a park of this character could be considered a
“public function,” thus subjecting the private trustees’ actions to Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny.40 In any event, the city’s mere resignation as trustee
did not achieve a constitutional settlement. Wherever formal title may lie,
the Court held, the park still retained its public character.41 If they were to
manage the park, public officials would have to integrate it.
The Baconsfield saga did not end with the Court’s decision in Newton,
however. The Georgia courts held that, in light of Newton’s mandate that
the park could no longer be maintained on a segregated basis, the trust had
failed.42 In light of this failure, the park property reverted to Senator Bacon’s heirs.43 In order to effectuate the testator’s intent, the heirs planned to
close the park altogether rather than integrate it.44 The same plaintiffs who
had sought access to the park in Newton now claimed that the courts should
have applied the cy pres doctrine to amend the terms of the will by striking
the racial restrictions, thus opening the park to all without regard to race.45
The failure to do so, they claimed, resulted in maintenance of a segregated
facility in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.46
Justice Black, writing for the Court in Evans v. Abney, appeared
somewhat sympathetic to this claim: “When a city park is destroyed because the Constitution requires it to be integrated, there is reason for everyone to be disheartened.”47 Justice Black also said that “federal courts must
search out the fact and truth of any proceeding or transaction to determine if
the Constitution has been violated.”48 Nevertheless, in Abney the Court up37

Id. at 301.
See id. (noting that the park was “swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and maintained by the
city as a public facility for whites only”).
39
See id.
40
Id. at 301–02; see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (applying Fifteenth
Amendment scrutiny to the administration of elections by a private club); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 508–09 (1946) (applying First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny to private company town’s restrictions on speech).
41
Newton, 382 U.S. at 302.
42
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 436 (1970).
43
Id.
44
See id. at 444 (noting that state courts had interpreted Senator Bacon’s will as “embodying a preference for termination of the park rather than its integration”).
45
See id. at 439.
46
See id. at 436–37, 440.
47
Id. at 443.
48
Id. at 443–44.
38
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held Senator Bacon’s apparent preference that the park be closed rather than
integrated.49 Foreshadowing future property disposition cases, the Court
said that Abney was not a case “in which a city holds an absolute fee simple
title to a public park and then closes that park of its own accord solely to
avoid the effect of a prior court order directing that the park be integrated as
the Fourteenth Amendment commands.”50 The Court was not prepared,
said Justice Black, to declare that even this apparent act of circumvention
would necessarily be unconstitutional.51 Here, the Court stated, any “discriminatory motivation” had been injected not by any government actor but
by the testator and his heirs.52 Nor, said the Court,53 was the case controlled
by Shelley v. Kraemer,54 which invalidated judicial action affirmatively enforcing a private scheme of restrictive residential covenants.55 The Court
held that the effect of the Georgia Supreme Court decision “eliminated all
discrimination against Negroes in the park by eliminating the park itself.”56
Thus, any loss occasioned by closure of the park was shared equally by
blacks and whites.57
The Abney majority construed the closure of Baconsfield as merely the
unfortunate result of private racial discrimination. Justice Brennan, in dissent, saw the case very differently. He described the discriminatory closing
of Baconsfield as “permeated with state action,” including express state
statutory authorization of discriminatory devises, the city’s participation in
an agreement that provided for a reversion to private heirs in the event the
park could not be maintained as a segregated facility, the city’s maintenance
of the park as a segregated facility, and the state court’s enforcement of the
racial restriction.58 According to Justice Brennan, “No record could present
a clearer case of the closing of a public facility for the sole reason that the
public authority that owns and maintains it cannot keep it segregated.”59
According to Justice Brennan, although it would be permissible to close a
public park owing to expense or superfluousness, “under the Equal Protection Clause a State may not close down a public facility solely to avoid its
duty to desegregate that facility.”60 The closing of Baconsfield, he con-

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 444.
Id. at 445.
See id. (“assuming arguendo” that such a scenario would violate the Equal Protection Clause).
Id.
Id.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 20; see also Abney, 396 U.S. at 445.
Abney, 396 U.S. at 445.
See id. at 446.
Id. at 454–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.
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tended, “conveys an unambiguous message of community involvement in
racial discrimination” that stigmatized blacks residing in the community.61
The Baconsfield saga demonstrates some of the core difficulties attending judicial review of settlement-by-disposition. On the one hand, official
divestment would appear on the surface to be an appropriate means of settling equality claims relating to the subject property because the state would
have fully divested itself of any involvement in the segregation of the park.
On the other hand, courts must always be mindful of the dangers of circumvention and sham transactions. Newton showed that the Court was willing
to look behind a formal disposition in order to test the bona fides of public
divestment in a critical public facility. Abney demonstrated the limits of
that intervention, even where the result was the closure of a former public
park rather than its previously ordered integration. The decision effectively
allowed the state to facilitate segregation while disclaiming any responsibility for it. Ultimately, the Court accepted the fiction that the closure affected
whites and blacks equally. Note that during the Baconsfield saga, the Court
carefully avoided deciding whether officials could simply close a public
property, either in response to a judicial integration order or because they
preferred closure to compliance with constitutional obligations. That question would arise in future equality cases, as well as in more contemporary
First Amendment disputes.62
B. Leases of Public Property
Abney was a rather unusual case, insofar as the city’s involvement
stemmed from the terms of a private devise. More commonly, states and
localities owned the subject properties from the outset. Rather than integrate these public properties, officials sought to extinguish equality claims
by privatizing them. During the civil rights era, local officials faced with
desegregation orders or political pressure to integrate frequently leased public properties to private lessees. Public officials claimed that the leases extinguished any constitutional obligation to integrate. Plaintiffs argued that
the leases were sham or pretextual transactions, entered into to avoid desegregation decrees or with the intent that segregation continue unabated in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Not surprisingly, in light of Brown’s specific command, courts tended
to view leasing arrangements involving public school facilities with particular skepticism.63 For example, the en banc Fifth Circuit disapproved of one
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Id. at 453–54.
See discussion infra Parts I.D., III.D.
63
The root problem was that localities subject to desegregation orders often undermined school integration and encouraged “white flight” by leasing or selling public school buildings and facilities to allwhite academies. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973) (noting a dramatic rise in
private schools in Mississippi following desegregation orders).
62
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such leasing arrangement in United States v. Mississippi.64 A school board
had leased an unused public school facility to a civic association, which in
turn entered into a sublease with the Sylvarena Baptist Academy, a private
segregated school.65 The sublease, which was for a term of twenty-five
years, provided that the Academy would pay an annual rent of five dollars
to the school’s superintendent.66 The United States Department of Justice
filed a complaint seeking to have the sublease set aside on the ground that it
impeded a school desegregation order.67 The district court found that the
lease between the school board and the association was entered into in good
faith, without any knowledge by the school board that the building would
be used for an all-white school.68 The sublease was a different matter. The
court found that it had been entered into largely in response to local parental
objections to desegregation of the public schools.69
Disagreeing with a panel decision that had allowed the sublease but enjoined the private school from making admissions decisions based on race,
the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc set aside the sublease.70 The court explained that local school districts that attempt to “continue or re-establish
the previously discarded segregated order through private means [would be]
prohibited from receiving government largesse in their endeavors.”71 It held
that the school board had facilitated and encouraged the operation of a private segregated school facility by approving the sublease, receiving rent
under the lease, and retaining a reversionary interest in the property.72
Whatever the school board’s motive or purpose, the court concluded that
the arrangement had culminated in an “illicit union of the state with segregated education” that had emanated directly from public opposition to desegregation.73 In ordering that the sublease be set aside and the transaction
unwound, the Fifth Circuit found it particularly noteworthy that, as in a
prior Supreme Court case overturning a city’s aid to segregated private
schools, the sublease “operated directly to contravene an outstanding school
desegregation order.”74 The court also noted the Supreme Court’s earlier
admonition, in Cooper v. Aaron,75 that the equal protection rights of children to attend desegregated schools could not be nullified directly or indi-

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

499 F.2d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id. at 430, 438.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436 (quoting Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568 (1974)).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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rectly “through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’”76
Skepticism with regard to leasing arrangements extended to recreational and other public properties as well. An early district court opinion
addressing desegregation of public pools summarized what would become
the prevailing sentiment:
It is not conceivable that a city can provide the ways and means for a private
individual or corporation to discriminate against its own citizens. Having set
up the swimming pool by authority of the Legislature, the City, if the pool is
operated, must operate it itself, or, if leased, must see that is it operated without any such discrimination.77

Thus, civil rights era courts held that officials could not avoid constitutional obligations to integrate city golf courses, courthouse cafeterias, and
public parks by simply leasing the properties to private individuals or interests.78
In sum, civil rights era courts generally agreed that mere leases of
public properties like schools, golf courses, swimming pools, and courthouse cafeterias were not sufficient to extinguish constitutional claims.
Unlike the complete divestment in Abney, municipalities continued to have
a stake in these private enterprises. Although the lease agreement itself was
generally sufficient evidence of state involvement, in most cases municipalities were more deeply involved in the joint enterprise.79 In these cases,
courts were not willing to permit public officials to use a private property
law mechanism to undermine the constitutional guarantee of equal access to
public properties. The courts generally saw leases for what they often
were—efforts to circumvent or avoid the obligation to desegregate public
properties.
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United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d at 437 (quoting Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17).
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
78
See City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425, 426 (4th Cir. 1957) (upholding an injunction
prohibiting a city golf course that was under lease to a private golf club from denying access to blacks);
Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1956) (upholding an injunction prohibiting a county
from renewing or extending the lease of a cafeteria located in a county courthouse to a vendor that refused to serve black customers); Dep’t of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615, 616 (4th Cir.
1956) (per curiam) (upholding a decree requiring that a leased park be operated on a nonsegregated basis, whether or not it could be so operated profitably). This principle extended to arrangements that, either by express terms of the lease or a requirement that the lessee comply with local laws forbidding
integration, required lessees to discriminate. See Recent Developments, Transfer by City Held Effective
to Avoid Finding of State Action, 16 STAN. L. REV. 197, 199 n.9 (1963) (collecting cases).
79
See, e.g., Plummer, 240 F.2d at 925–26 (noting that the county not only had provided the courthouse building and services, but also had been aware of the private vendor’s discriminatory practices
prior to the lease). As the Supreme Court clarified five years after Plummer, the leased cafeteria was a
classic symbiotic arrangement between the state and a private actor. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723–26 (1961) (holding that a coffee shop and the state had entered into an interdependent relationship, such that the private shop owner’s racial discrimination constituted state action).
77
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C. Sales, Donations, and Other Transfers
Owing to the fact that leases were not generally considered adequate
divestments or settlements, officials frequently turned to sales, donations,
and other transfers of title. As in the leasing context, some of these dispositions were direct responses to pending desegregation decrees. Others were
reactions to local community pressure to resist integration. The question
posed by these dispositions was whether the transfer of title extinguished
any equality obligations with respect to the subject properties.
As in the leasing context, courts were quite skeptical of local efforts to
sell or otherwise transfer public school property to private academies or institutions. This was true even where the property was characterized by the
government as surplus, abandoned, or otherwise not financially viable. In
Wright v. City of Brighton, for example, the city initially planned to lease,
but later sold, an abandoned school building to the Hoover Academy, a private, all-white school.80 The record established that local officials, who at
the time were operating under a desegregation order, were fully aware that
the school property would be used to house a segregated private educational
facility.81 The Fifth Circuit rescinded the sale on the grounds that the city
was facilitating and encouraging the establishment of a private segregated
academy, thereby undermining ongoing efforts to desegregate the local
schools.82 The disposition was prohibited in Wright even though the property had been sold rather than leased, the city was no longer involved in its
operation, the city provided no financial or other assistance to the private
facility, and the city had retained no future interest in the property.83 The
Wright court readily conceded that it could find no precedent finding state
involvement on similar facts.84 Such support was not necessary, said the
court, since plaintiffs were challenging not the discriminatory admissions
policies of the academy but the actual sale itself.85
In holding that the sale violated the Equal Protection Clause, Wright
relied on both its purpose and effect. As to purpose, the court found compelling the uncontroverted evidence that the city knew the purchaser would
operate a segregated facility.86 Issuing its opinion just prior to Palmer v.
Thompson, in which the Supreme Court held that motive alone was not dis-
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441 F.2d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 1971). A district court judge had strongly suggested that under wellestablished law, a similar lease arrangement would have violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at
448–49.
81
Id. at 452.
82
Id. at 453.
83
Id. at 449–50.
84
Id. at 450.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 451.
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positive in property disposition cases,87 the Fifth Circuit condemned the
city’s motives in the strongest terms: “The transformation from a leasing arrangement to a sale is almost sardonic in its cynicism and makes it obvious
that the city was completely aware of the buyer’s racial policies at the time
the sale was consummated.”88 In assessing the city’s motive or purpose, the
Wright court reviewed recent desegregation history. It took into account
both the civil rights context in general and the particular year leading up to
the sale (1969), which it described as “a febrile and frenetic year of desegregation freighted with plans for compliance, court decrees, and schemes of
evasion.”89 The court emphasized that courts were hardly unaware of local
resistance to desegregation and admonished officials that judges ought not
to be considered “naively unsophisticated” when it came to local evasion
and subterfuge.90
The court also relied on the practical effect of the city’s sale of the
property, which it said was to further segregation in the schools.91 Acknowledging the symbolic significance of the subject property, the Wright
court noted that the operation of an all-white school in a formerly public
school building would “place a special burden and a badge of opprobrium
on the Negro citizens of Brighton, Alabama.”92
One year after Wright, the Fifth Circuit decided McNeal v. Tate County
School District, another case involving the sale of public school property.93
In McNeal, the local school board advertised for bids on an unused school
that had been closed for educational and economic reasons.94 The highest
bid—indeed the only bid—was submitted by a private, segregated academy.95 The school board sold the property to the academy and executed a
quitclaim deed.96 In contrast to the facts in Wright, however, the school
board in McNeal did not know at the time of the sale that the property
would be used for a private segregated school (although they were aware of
a local movement to establish private segregated schools).97 The district
court found that the school board had acted in good faith and in accordance
with the law in effectuating the sale, had received adequate consideration,
87

See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224, 226 (1971) (holding that the closing of public pools
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
88
Wright, 441 F.2d at 452.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 453; see also Wright v. Baker County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 131, 134–35 (5th Cir. 1974)
(rescinding the sale of a surplus public school building to a private segregated academy specifically established to counteract the effects of court ordered desegregation).
91
Wright, 441 F.2d at 451.
92
Id. at 452.
93
460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1972), modified on reh’g, 460 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
94
Id. at 570.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 570–71.
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and had lawfully advertised the sale.98 Moreover, the district court found
that the sale was not entered into in response to an integration order and that
the operation of the private academy would not interfere with the effort to
desegregate the school system.99
McNeal initially reversed the district court and held that rescission of
the sale was the appropriate remedy.100 However, perhaps owing to the absence of bad faith and the district court’s finding that the sale would not interfere with the desegregation of the local school system, the court held on
rehearing that the sale should be upheld but the private academy should itself be required to admit applicants without regard to race.101 Thus, although the sale was not considered a sham, the private purchaser’s future
use of the school facility was limited by the constitutional right of schoolchildren to attend without regard to race. The court did not explain the basis for imposing this continuing obligation on a private purchaser. One can
surmise, however, that it stemmed from the school board’s obligation to
maintain an integrated school system.102 Although it permitted the sale, on
rehearing the McNeal court cautioned that future sales of public school
property “should be scrutinized with the utmost care and caution to the end
that public school property shall not be converted to use by private schools
which engage in forbidden discriminatory practices.”103
During the civil rights era, courts were also called upon to review the
constitutionality of sales involving recreational properties. Some desegregation decrees involving such properties contained language forbidding
disposition of the subject properties except by “bona fide sale.”104 The provisions were inserted to prevent evasion of desegregation orders.105
Whether a sale or other disposition was bona fide or sham was a factintensive inquiry. Courts looked at all of the circumstances of the sale, including the terms of the purchase agreement and the timing of the transaction.
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Id. at 569; id. at 572, 573 (Gewin, J., dissenting).
McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., No. EC7029-S, 1970 WL 118111, at *5–6 (N.D. Miss. Aug.
19, 1970).
100
See McNeal, 460 F.2d at 570–71.
101
Id. at 574; accord United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425, 432 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc)
(opining that the remedy in McNeal was based on the court’s findings that the school board acted in
good faith and that the sale did not appear to interfere with desegregation).
102
McNeal, 460 F.2d at 571–72 (noting that school boards “are charged with the affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to bring about a unitary educational system which is free from
racial discrimination”).
103
Id. at 574–75.
104
E.g., City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425, 426 (4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
105
E.g., id.
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Some courts held that public property dispositions were collusive
schemes designed to avoid integration.106 Others refused to validate a proposed settlement-by-disposition even where no evidence of bad faith was
present. For example, in Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, the Fifth Circuit
held that the sale of two municipal golf courses to private purchasers did
not extinguish the equal protection claims of prospective black patrons who
were denied the right to play based on race.107 Just one day before an injunction prohibiting it from operating the courses on a racially segregated
basis was to take effect, the city closed the golf courses.108 A few months
later, the city council passed an ordinance authorizing the sale of the two
properties.109 The council then took bids on terms the court described as
“very favorable to any prospective purchaser.”110 The purchase prices did,
however, appear to reflect the properties’ fair market value, and the court
noted that there was no contention that the sales were made in bad faith; in
other words, there were no “side agreements or understandings between the
City and the purchasers to the effect that the purchasers would operate the
golf courses on a segregated basis if they acquired title to them.”111
Nevertheless, Hampton held that state action remained present even after the purchases were effectuated.112 That conclusion was based almost entirely on the presence in both purchase agreements of a reversionary
clause,113 which provided that in the event the property was used for any
purpose other than a golf course it would revert to the city or its successors.114 The court acknowledged that the city was entitled to discontinue
operation of its golf courses “if it decide[d] for any reason that it no longer
wishe[d] to [run them].”115 But it was not permitted, the court said, to impose an absolute obligation on the present owners to operate a golf course,
thereby maintaining what the court characterized as “complete present con-
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See, e.g., Smith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634, 638–41,
647–48 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming a district court decision that the YMCA, which had purchased pools
and other recreational facilities from the city just prior to the entry of a judicial integration order, was a
state actor subject to constitutional guarantees of equality).
107
304 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1962).
108
Id. (Gewin, J., dissenting).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 320 (majority opinion). By this the court seemed to mean that the sales were effectuated
based on relatively small down payments and extended payment periods. Id.
111
Id. at 321.
112
See id. at 323.
113
Id. (“We conclude that the inclusion of the reversionary clause in these conveyances constituted
the purchasers of the two golf courses state agents, within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
114
See id. at 320–21.
115
Id. at 322. It is likely that the court did not mean literally “any” reason, but valid and raceneutral reasons, such as expense.
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trol” of the property.116 According to the court, this would be no different
from entering a long-term lease for a particular purpose with a right of cancellation should that purpose not be carried out—a situation courts would
have no trouble characterizing as state action.117 Although the opinion certainly was couched in the language of state action, its tenor, including the
reference to the favorable terms of purchase, strongly suggested that the
Hampton court viewed the sale as a sham or pretext. In relying heavily on
the presence of a future interest in the purchase agreements, the court
seemed to be stretching the state action doctrine to prevent circumvention
of the equality guarantee.
This sort of careful judicial parsing of disposition instruments was not
uncommon during the civil rights era. In Eaton v. Grubbs, for example, the
Fourth Circuit held that the James Walker Memorial Hospital, which the
city of Wilmington, North Carolina had donated to a private board, remained a state actor subject to the Equal Protection Clause.118 Black physicians and their patients had sued the hospital for denying them admission to
staff membership and treatment facilities based on their race.119 Six years
earlier, in a case involving the same parties, the Fourth Circuit had held that
the conveyance of the hospital to the board had extinguished the equal protection claims of the physicians and patients.120 In Grubbs, however, the
court made an independent examination of the relationship between the city
and the hospital.121 The court found that “[p]erhaps the most significant
evidence of the state’s involvement in the hospital’s affairs is the presence
of the reverter clause in the deed.”122 The reverter clause in Grubbs provided that in the event the property was no longer used as a hospital, it
would revert to the city.123 While the court viewed the reverter clause as the
“most significant” evidence of the city’s control of the hospital and quoted
116

Id. As the dissenting opinion noted, however, a reversionary interest is not commonly considered a present estate, but rather the possibility of an estate sometime in the future. Id. at 327–28 (Gewin,
J., dissenting).
117
Id. at 322–23 (majority opinion). In the alternative, like the Supreme Court in Newton, the
Hampton court relied on a public function theory of state action. The operation of municipal golf
courses, the court reasoned, is the performance of a state function; it is, the court opined, the equivalent
of granting a franchise for public transportation to a local bus company. Id.
118
329 F.2d 710, 711–12, 715 (4th Cir. 1964).
119
Id. at 711.
120
Eaton v. Bd. of Managers of the James Walker Mem’l Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958). The
court noted that after the conveyance, the hospital was neither owned nor controlled by the municipality
and received only 4.5% of its total income from public funds. Id. at 527.
121
Grubbs, 329 F.2d at 712. In doing so, rather than affording the prior case res judicata effect, the
court noted that both Supreme Court and circuit precedent had changed. Id. Among other things, the
Supreme Court had decided Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), which clarified that the state action inquiry was fact-intensive and that courts must look closely at the mutually
beneficial relationships involving state and private actors. See Grubbs, 329 F.2d at 712.
122
Id. at 713.
123
Id.
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Hampton with approval,124 there was also substantial additional evidence of
state involvement. Among other things, the hospital was subject to detailed
city regulations and the city continued to provide for most of its operational
needs.125 In essence, as in Hampton, the court detected an effort by the state
to circumvent desegregation obligations without total divestment of public
interest and control.
Not all civil rights era courts took such a jaundiced view of settlementby-disposition, however. Hampton and Grubbs suggested that a good faith
sale, particularly one effectuated without a reversionary clause, might be
constitutional. Moreover, even in situations where there was strong evidence that officials were seeking to circumvent desegregation decrees
through sales or donations, not all courts were willing to hold that the proposed dispositions were shams. For example, in Wood v. Hogan, a district
court held that the transfer of a hospital from a municipal authority to a private corporation settled equal protection claims by patients that the hospital
had segregated them by race.126 This was so, according to the court, even
though the transfer was plainly effectuated to avoid a desegregation order.127
Other courts, while purporting to engage in close scrutiny of property dispositions, also upheld sales and other dispositions that appeared to be at
least as questionable as those invalidated in Hampton and Grubbs.128
Civil rights era courts were undoubtedly aware that state and local officials sometimes, perhaps even often, used private property mechanisms
such as sales and donations to avoid equality obligations. However, they
were also mindful of local officials’ traditional power to dispose of public
properties. In light of Brown, courts were most likely to invalidate sales or
donations of school properties. Even when the disposition was allowed,
moreover, courts sometimes imposed equality obligations on the private
purchasers of school properties. The treatment of recreational properties
was less uniform. In assessing the bona fides of these dispositions, some
courts invalidated even facially valid sales and donations on the thinnest of
grounds—including the mere retention of a future property interest by the
state or locality. Other courts seemed to be satisfied that constitutional requirements had been met so long as title formally changed hands. Although
courts were gaining an education with regard to local civil rights evasion,
judicial review of sales and donations of public properties tended to be a
fact-specific and ad hoc reaction to local tactics. The decisions generally
124

See id. at 714 (quoting Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1962)).
Id. at 714–15.
126
215 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Va. 1963).
127
See id. at 56. Interestingly enough, the same judge earlier had endorsed patient segregation on
the ground that it would benefit the health of the patients. See Wood v. Vaughn, 209 F. Supp. 106, 116
(W.D. Va. 1962).
128
See, e.g., Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890, 891–92 (4th Cir. 1960) (upholding the
sale of a municipal pool at public auction to a corporation formed with the assistance of a city official
who had opposed integration of the pool).
125
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did not convey the sense that public officials were different from ordinary
sellers, nor, outside the schools context, did they acknowledge the strong
community resistance to desegregation and the powerful symbolism that
segregated privatized properties conveyed.
D. Closures
As discussed, sales, donations, and other transfers of public property to
private owners did not always settle equal protection concerns. If all other
dispositions failed, municipalities had one more option. Governments are
not constitutionally required to own or maintain public properties and facilities. Thus, officials appear to have the option of closing the public property
or facility altogether. Indeed, Abney suggested that closing a public park to
all residents might satisfy the equality guarantee—perhaps even if the closure followed an integration order.129 Although closure was a drastic disposition in many respects, particularly since it would deprive entire
communities of the use of certain public properties, officials sometimes resorted to closure in an effort to circumvent equal access obligations.
Closure of public school properties posed the gravest threat to desegregation. During the 1950s and 1960s, both the lower courts and the Supreme
Court encountered public school closure laws. Lower courts held that officials could not constitutionally close only those schools subject to desegregation orders, while maintaining other facilities of a like kind.130 In 1961,
the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court judgment that held unconstitutional several Louisiana laws empowering the governor to close any school
ordered to integrate, and to close all state schools if any were integrated.131
Three years later, in Griffin v. County School Board, the Supreme Court
held that Prince Edward County could not constitutionally close its public
schools while contributing financial support to private segregated white
schools that took their place.132 Thus, it was made clear that maintenance of
dual school systems violated the Equal Protection Clause. The courts held
that these purported settlements offended the prohibition on dual school
systems and would have had the purpose and effect of discriminating based
on race.
Although the threat of school closures was present, the Court never
ruled directly on whether a state or locality could simply shutter all of its
public schools. In the end, although many Southern officials threatened to
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Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970).
See, e.g., Allen v. County Sch. Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va. 1962); James v. Almond, 170 F.
Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959).
131
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (per curiam), aff’g 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.
La. 1960).
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377 U.S. 218, 231–34 (1964).
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close the public schools, none actually exercised this drastic option.133 Had
they done so, the Court would have been faced with a ripe conflict between
two fundamental principles: On the one hand, Brown guaranteed equal access to education, but on the other hand, the Constitution did not require
that states maintain public school systems at all. As Michael Klarman has
observed, one of the primary reasons Southern officials did not carry
through with their public closure threats is that white Southerners, particularly parents with school-aged children, had calculated the costs of closure
and were simply not willing to pay them.134 Democratic limits, most importantly a public unwilling to go along with this gambit, were thus the primary obstacle to this particular form of circumvention-by-disposition.135
Closure was a more viable option with regard to other public properties, however. In the 1960s, some lower courts had assumed that municipalities could close recreational facilities, even in the face of a judicial order
to desegregate them.136 The Supreme Court was late in addressing the issue.
In Palmer v. Thompson, decided in 1971, the Court upheld the decision of
the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, to halt operation of five public
swimming pools.137 The vote to close the pools was taken after a federal
district court had declared segregation of the city’s recreational facilities to
be unconstitutional.138 Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Black
found that while the closures constituted state action, they did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.139
Justice Black began with the fundamental proposition that “neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor any Act of Congress purports to impose an affirmative duty on a State to begin to operate or to continue to operate
swimming pools.”140 He noted that the district court had accepted the city’s
explanation that the pools were closed owing to a combination of economic
and public safety concerns.141 Nor was it the case, he said, that in Jackson
133

See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290–421 (2004) (recounting Southern efforts to gain support for public school closure laws).
134
Id. at 417–19.
135
Id. at 416–19.
136
See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (upholding
a trial court’s refusal to hold the city in contempt for closing public swimming pools after a permanent
injunction had been entered ordering that the pools be desegregated); City of Montgomery v. Gilmore,
277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960) (upholding the closure of city parks under similar circumstances).
137
403 U.S. 217, 218–19 (1971). One pool, which the city had leased from the YMCA, was returned to the YMCA and was subsequently operated by it on a segregated basis. Id. at 222. Another
pool was eventually purchased by Jackson State College. Id. The three other city pools were closed
down completely. See id. at 220. Many other city recreational facilities remained open and were operating on a desegregated basis. See id. at 220 n.5.
138
Id. at 219.
139
Id. at 220, 224–26.
140
Id. at 220.
141
Id. at 225.
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“whites [we]re permitted to use public facilities while blacks [we]re denied
access.”142 The majority claimed the record contained nothing to discredit
the city’s claim that it had “completely and finally ceased running swimming pools for all time.”143 The city thus was neither involved in the operation of the pools, nor responsible for encouraging those operating the pools
to discriminate.144 In sum, the Court held that the city council had settled or
avoided the equality controversy by eliminating the public facility itself.
Palmer has become perhaps best known for the Court’s statements
concerning judicial review of official motives.145 Petitioners claimed that
Jackson’s decision to close the pools was motivated solely by a desire to
avoid a judicial integration order.146 Justice Black flatly (though arguably
incorrectly)147 stated that “no case in this Court has held that a legislative act
may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men
who voted for it.”148 The Court relied in particular on United States v.
O’Brien,149 a First Amendment case decided three years earlier in which it
had emphasized the difficulties inherent in motive analysis.150 The Palmer
Court also recast prior decisions, in which motive seemed to be critical to
the outcome, as based not on motive but on the actual effects of the laws in
question.151 In the end, the majority accepted the city’s race-neutral explanation for the closure.152 In separate concurrences, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun both expressed concerns regarding the adoption of a rule
“that every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally ‘locks
in’ the public sponsor so that it may not be dropped.”153
Justice White wrote a vigorous dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, in which he disagreed that the pool closings were racially neutral.
142

Id. at 220.
Id. at 222.
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Id. at 222–24.
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See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 99–102 (discussing the Palmer Court’s approach to governmental
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Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208–12 (1970), which discusses cases in a variety of doctrinal areas that, beginning in the 1920s, involved the Court in motive inquiries.
146
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224.
147
See Brest, supra note 145, at 99–100 (characterizing prior equal protection cases as turning on
legislative motive).
148
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224.
149
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
150
See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224–25 (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383, 384) (noting the difficulty in
ascertaining legislative motive and the futility of invalidating acts based on improper motive).
151
Id. at 225. For example, the Court described Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960),
in which a racial gerrymander had been invalidated, as a decision based upon the effect that virtually all
blacks had been excluded from voting in town elections rather than one based upon the motive of the
drafters of the racial gerrymander. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225.
152
See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226.
153
Id. at 228 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 229–30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
143
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He interpreted the pool closings as “an expression of official policy that
Negroes are unfit to associate with whites.”154 In contrast to the majority,
Justice White was not at all troubled by judicial review of official motives;
indeed, he noted that federal civil rights laws often explicitly demand proof
of defendants’ motive or animus.155 After describing at some length Jackson’s longstanding resistance to desegregation orders in various contexts,156
Justice White concluded that its economic and public safety rationales were
entirely pretextual. City officials had simply determined, he said, that compliance with the desegregation order “would be intolerable to Jackson’s
citizens.”157 Justice White concluded: “State action predicated solely on
opposition to a lawful court order to desegregate is a denial of equal protection of the laws.”158
Palmer, like Abney, demonstrated that there were limits to judicial review of settlement-by-disposition. The outcomes in both cases suggested
that so long as they were willing to do without certain facilities, local officials could simply close them to the public. The closure had the effect of
extinguishing all constitutional claims of equal access. In so holding, the
Court refused to apply the same skepticism to pool closures that it had applied to school closures. In Palmer, Justice Black attempted to distinguish
the school cases on the grounds that operating the schools was a more important enterprise than operating the public pools and that school boards
were not attempting to actually close their schools but to operate dual systems.159 But the majority did not explain why outright closure, particularly
in the face of an integration order, was considered less constitutionally
problematic than unequal access. Nor, in focusing narrowly on the terms of
divestment, did it respond to Justice White’s concerns regarding the discriminatory symbolism and disregard of minority rights that resulted from
the closure. In the end, Palmer allowed public officials to avoid constitutional obligations and judicial integration orders so long as they articulated
facially plausible economic or public safety reasons for their actions. Although subsequent doctrinal developments have called Palmer’s equal protection analysis into question,160 the case has never been expressly
overruled.
154

Id. at 240–41 (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 241–42.
156
See id. at 243–50.
157
Id. at 255; accord id. at 254 (“[T]here can be no disagreement that the desegregation ruling . . . was the event that precipitated the city’s decision to cease furnishing public swimming facilities
to its citizens.”).
158
Id. at 265.
159
Id. at 221 n.6.
160
When Palmer was decided, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified that intent or purpose was
the touchstone of a racial discrimination claim. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976)
(holding that disparate impact alone does not make out an equal protection claim). Today, intent or purpose is the primary focus of an equal protection claim. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN
155
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As this examination of civil rights era cases demonstrates, the conflict
between the state’s authority to dispose of public properties and the protection of constitutional liberties that depend upon access to them is a longstanding concern. During this period, state and local officials often treated
public properties as expendable in the face of equality claims. They disposed of properties to facilitate local majority preferences in favor of segregation. In terms of protecting equal access to public properties, the legacy
of the civil rights courts was decidedly mixed. Circumvention-bydisposition was generally thwarted with regard to the schools, but was
sometimes permitted with regard to other properties. As they moved from
leases to sales to outright closures, courts eventually acceded to officials’
dispositions. To be sure, a few courts stretched mightily to hold public officials accountable for what they saw as sham transactions. It ultimately
became clear, however, that like any other owner of property states and localities could divest themselves of assets. Palmer suggested that even when
executed in the face of judicial integration orders, such property divestments might represent legitimate constitutional settlements. In assessing
the bona fides of a wide variety of property dispositions, civil rights era
courts were sometimes remiss in emphasizing that public officials owed
specific duties under the Equal Protection Clause to comply with integration orders, to preserve public facilities, and to protect minority rights to use
public properties even in the face of public opposition.
II. PROPERTY DISPOSITION AND ESTABLISHMENT CONTROVERSIES
The civil rights era provided the courts with their first sustained look at
settlement-by-disposition. The practice has recently resurfaced in the Establishment Clause context. Public officials have increasingly turned to
property dispositions as a means of settling or avoiding establishment
claims and controversies. Thus, rather than remove publicly displayed
symbols that courts have found to violate the Establishment Clause, officials have privatized the public parcels and symbols. They also have occasionally privatized public forum properties, including public streets, in
order to avoid Establishment Clause concerns.161 In addition, public law
mechanisms such as eminent domain have been used to transfer ownership
of public properties at the center of establishment controversies.162 As they
did in civil rights era equality cases, courts have struggled to identify the
constitutional limits of settlement-by-disposition in the establishment area.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1504 n.23 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that “[a]lthough the formal obituary has not yet
been published, Palmer has been quietly but unmistakably buried” by Davis (citations omitted)).
161
See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1259–63 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding the sale of a public easement to a church).
162
See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (upholding
the federal acquisition, through the exercise of eminent domain, of a parcel of land containing a cross to
be designated as a national monument).
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In Salazar v. Buono, its most recent encounter with settlement-bydisposition in the establishment area, the Supreme Court declined to make
any “sweeping pronouncements” or announce any “categorical rules.”163
A. Privatization and Religious Symbols
The constitutional standards relating to displays of religious symbols
on public land are notoriously murky. To oversimplify matters, the Supreme Court has indicated that sectarian symbols generally must be displayed along with some secular elements in order to avoid the
unconstitutional endorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause.164
Thus, a statue of the Ten Commandments may not be displayed on its own,
but may be included in a display of collected foundational legal and historical documents.165 The display of unaccompanied religious symbols such as
crosses, statues of Jesus Christ, and depictions of the Ten Commandments
on public land will generally violate the Establishment Clause. The question then becomes what remedial action must be taken to cure the violation.
Public officials have at least four options when they are faced with a
valid objection to the display of a religious symbol on public property or
have been ordered by a court to remove the display.166 First, they can simply remove the symbol,167 which was the traditional response in such situations.168 Second, where feasible, officials might alter the public display so
that it comports with the Establishment Clause.169 Third, assuming it can be
163

Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010).
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850–51, 874–76 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 684 (2005); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 679–80 (1984).
165
See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 874 (observing that sacred text may be displayed in the company of other legal or historical documents).
166
A fifth possible option, adopting the religious symbol as government speech, is discussed below.
See infra Part III.E.
167
Some have argued that removal ought not to be ordered by a court where it cannot be done without substantially damaging or destroying the symbol. See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying
the Endorsement of Symbolic Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 229–30 (2004).
168
See id. at 186 (noting that “until relatively recently, unconstitutional displays were simply removed from public land in the typical case—a remedy that directly resolved the violation without need
for elaborate judicial analysis”). See generally Christopher Lauderman, Note, Building a Fence of Separation: The Constitutional Validity of Land Transfers in Escaping from Establishment Clause Violations, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1193, 1201–06 (2008) (discussing cases involving land transfers and
religious symbols).
169
See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850 (considering a Kentucky courthouse’s display of
the Ten Commandments modified and supplemented with displays of other religious and historical texts
to create a collective display purporting to present the foundations for Kentucky’s laws). This option
may be somewhat questionable after McCreary County. There the Court held that McCreary County’s
original sectarian purpose in erecting a Ten Commandments display was not cured by later secularization of the display. Id. at 871–72. But the Court also added that the county’s past actions did not “forever taint” any public display of a religious symbol. Id. at 873–74. Thus, it appears that where the
original purpose was severely tainted, secularization will not suffice. Where a display is not invalidated
164
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done without destroying or substantially damaging the display, officials
might relocate the symbol to private property. Lately, however, officials
increasingly have resorted to a fourth option: privatizing the underlying
property. Rather than remove or relocate sectarian symbols, local and federal officials have sold the public parcels on which they are located to private owners.
Officials claim that these dispositions settle any
Establishment Clause controversies because they extinguish any antiestablishment obligations with respect to the properties.
As was true during the civil rights era, the cases in this area demonstrate that some courts are aware of the possibility that officials might attempt to circumvent constitutional obligations by disposing of public
properties. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, a formalist approach that bases the validity of an Establishment Clause settlement solely upon the locus of title after
disposition “invites manipulation.”170 Still, courts have not generally reviewed settlement-by-disposition in this context with any deep skepticism.
Indeed, the presumption seems to be that such dispositions constitute valid
constitutional settlements. As the court stated in Marshfield, “Absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective way for a public
body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.”171 The cases indicate that the facts must be truly extraordinary for a purported settlement-bydisposition to be invalidated.
For example, in Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, La Crosse Aerie
1254, the Seventh Circuit upheld the sale of a Ten Commandments monument and the parcel on which it was located.172 Installed in 1965 in order to
honor the flood-fighting efforts of area youth, the monument was located in
a corner of the 1.5 acre Cameron Park (in La Crosse, Wisconsin), directly
across from the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) headquarters.173 The city
expended no funds maintaining the display.174 In 2001, residents asked that
the monument be moved, but the city refused.175 After then declining three
separate offers from different groups to take the monument and move it to
another location,176 the city council passed a resolution indicating that it intended to keep the monument in its current location.177 To effectuate this,
on purpose grounds, however, but rather based upon its effects, secularization may remain a viable option.
170
203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000).
171
Id.
172
395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2005).
173
Id. at 694–95.
174
Id. at 696.
175
Id. A previous lawsuit, filed in 1987, was dismissed for lack of standing. See Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 663 F. Supp. 606, 614 (W.D. Wis. 1987), aff’d 845 F.2d 1463 (7th Cir.
1988).
176
See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 696.
177
Id.
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the city decided to sell the monument to the FOE, along with a twenty-foot
by twenty-two-foot parcel of land around the monument.178 A lawsuit challenging the display was filed on July 1, 2002.179 Ten days later, the city
council adopted a resolution authorizing the sale of the parcel to FOE for
fair market value.180
As legal authority for the sale, the city council cited a Wisconsin law
that allowed such sales when parkland was no longer needed for park purposes, a fact the city council had found with regard to the subject parcel.181
The FOE erected a four-foot-high steel fence around the parcel, which was
bordered on three sides by a public park and on the other by a public sidewalk.182 It later added signs on all sides of the fence indicating that the parcel was private land and that the monument was dedicated to the flood
volunteers.183 The city then erected its own fence around the fenced-in parcel and placed signs on the north and south sides of the fence stating that
the property was not owned by the city and that the city did not endorse
“the religious expression thereon.”184
The district court held that the display as it existed prior to the sale violated the Establishment Clause, and that the sale itself constituted an independent violation of the Establishment Clause.185 It ordered that the plot of
land be returned to the city and the monument be removed from the park.186
The Seventh Circuit reversed.187 It rejected the claim that the impending
lawsuit, along with the city’s rejection of three separate offers to move the
monument, demonstrated an improper purpose to endorse religion by keeping the symbol in its present location.188 According to the court, removal
was an option but not a requirement.189 Moreover, the court said that the
“desire to keep the Monument in place c[ould not] automatically be labeled
a constitutional violation.”190 At the same time, the court claimed that it
was not “endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed to sell off patches of
government land to various religious denominations as a means of circumventing the Establishment Clause.”191

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
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Emphasizing the fact-specific nature of Establishment Clause inquiries,
the court then analyzed whether the sale involved any “unusual circumstances,” i.e., a failure to comply with local laws governing land sales, “a
sale to a straw purchaser that left the City with continuing power to exercise
the duties of ownership[,] or a sale well below fair market value.”192 The
court found that none of the indicia of a sham transaction were present.193 It
noted that the FOE had a “long-standing and important relationship with the
Monument,” and thus it made “practical sense” for the city to sell it to the
group.194 Finally, the court emphasized that the location and postdisposition physical characteristics of the monument presented little danger
of public misperception regarding ownership or endorsement.195 In a
strongly worded dissent, Judge Bauer stressed the city’s “stubborn refusal
to separate itself from the display of a purely religious monument.”196 The
property disposition, he claimed, “border[ed] on a fraud.”197 Judge Bauer
denounced the city’s disclaimer as “an obvious sham.”198
Similarly, in Chambers v. Frederick, a district court refused to enjoin
the display of a Ten Commandments monument on a parcel that had been
sold by the city to a different chapter of the FOE (once again the original
donor).199 Although the city’s facilities administrator had failed to comply
with local law requiring that the sale be publicly advertised and accepted,
the court refused to declare that the sale was a sham.200 The court emphasized the apparent sincerity of officials who sought to “dissociate” the city
from the monument by privatizing it, including the facilities administrator
who had mistakenly concluded that the sale was not subject to the public
advertising requirement.201 A reasonable observer, the court concluded,
would understand that the city’s sale of the property was intended to resolve
the constitutional issues raised by display of a religious monument on public property.202
192

Id.
Id. at 702–03.
194
Id. at 703.
195
Id. at 702–03. The court also held that the sale had a secular purpose and did not have the effect
of endorsing religion, as required under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Mercier, 395 F.3d at
704–05.
196
Mercier, 395 F.3d at 706 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570, 573 (D. Md. 2005).
200
Id. at 572–73.
201
Id. at 572.
202
Id. at 573; see also Kong v. City of San Francisco, 18 F. App’x 616, 618 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding the display of a cross atop Mt. Davidson, where abutting public park property and the private
parcel upon which the cross was displayed were visually and physically distinct, and the cross was accompanied by signs stating that it had been sold to a private group in order “to comply with a federal
court decision holding that the presence of the cross on public land violated the California Constitution”). In Kong, the panel majority did not consider it significant that the property had been sold with a
193
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In Marshfield itself, the court refused to invalidate the sale of the property but rather held only that the continued display of a fifteen-foot marble
statue of Jesus Christ in a public park was prohibited absent additional
signage and fencing.203 The statue at issue in Marshfield had been located
in the public park for thirty-nine years before a local resident filed a lawsuit
claiming that the display violated the Establishment Clause.204 Soon thereafter, a private organization offered to purchase the statue and the 0.15 acres
of land on which it was located.205 As required by Wisconsin law, the city
solicited bids for the statue and property.206 Upon accepting the organization’s bid, the city executed a warranty deed that included a restrictive
covenant requiring that the parcel be used for public park purposes.207 After
the sale, the city stopped providing electrical service to the parcel.208 Although the parcel on which the statue was located was not visibly differentiated from other city park property, prior to the sale the city had erected a
disclaimer stating that the location of the statue did not represent an endorsement of any religious sect or belief.209 The disclaimer remained on the
property after the sale, and the parties stipulated that the sale complied with
all local laws.210
In arguing that the mere transfer of title did not extinguish the establishment conflict because in effect it was a “sweetheart deal” designed to
circumvent the Establishment Clause,211 plaintiffs relied on Evans v. Newton, in which the substitution of private trustees was held not to have cured
the equal protection violation.212 The court interpreted Newton as a “public
function” case but in any event concluded that the continuing excessive involvement between the government and private actors in Newton was not
present in Marshfield.213 Indeed, the court concluded that the only possible
indicator of continuing governmental involvement with the property in
Marshfield was the presence of the restrictive covenant in the deed.214 Parting company with civil rights era cases like Hampton and Grubbs, the court
held that this was an insufficient basis for either finding continuing state in-

restrictive covenant requiring that the land remain open to the public. Kong, 18 F. App’x at 617–18.
But see id. at 618–19 (Canby, J., concurring) (emphasizing the restrictive covenant).
203
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 2000).
204
Id. at 489.
205
Id. at 489–90.
206
Id. at 490.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 489.
210
Id. at 490, 492.
211
Id. at 491.
212
Id. at 491–92 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)).
213
Id. at 492.
214
Id. at 492–93.
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volvement or voiding the transfer and concluded that the form of the transaction was not objectionable.215
Finding the form of the transaction to be valid, the Marshfield court
went on to assess the substance or effect of the disposition, i.e., whether,
even after the sale, the display of the statue on private property was an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. Based on the general location of the
statue, the physical layout of the park, and the location and orientation of
the statue, the court held that a reasonable observer would perceive that the
statue remained part of the city park and continued to constitute government
endorsement of religion.216 Given that no other displays had ever been present in the park—indeed, the record suggested that the park was built for
the purpose of displaying the statue—the court concluded that the statue’s
presence likely would be perceived by a reasonable observer as government, rather than private, endorsement of religion.217 As for a remedy, the
Seventh Circuit observed that either the owners had to remove the statue—
an option that would obviously limit private speech in a public forum—or
find “some way . . . to differentiate between property owned by the [private
owner] and property owned by the City.”218 According to the court, the latter option was the “appropriate solution.”219 The court recommended the
construction of “some defining structure, such as a permanent gated fence
or wall, to separate City property from [private] property accompanied by a
clearly visible disclaimer.”220 Ultimately, this was the remedy adopted on
remand.221
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Salazar v.
Buono,222 lower courts seemed to have settled on a few basic principles. As
Marshfield suggested, absent very unusual circumstances privatization
would be considered an appropriate settlement of Establishment Clause issues relating to the display of religious symbols on public property. A bona
fide sale, which is one that complies with local land disposition requirements, has generally been considered an appropriate means of terminating
establishment claims. As Marshfield also indicated, the fact that the government retains a reversionary or other future interest in the property does
not constitute grounds for voiding the transaction.223 However, in order to
ensure that no continuing endorsement was present, Marshfield and other
215

Id.
Id. at 494–95.
217
Id. at 495.
218
Id. at 497.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
The district court ordered that a four-foot-high wrought-iron fence and disclaimers be installed at
the site. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, No. 98-C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376,
at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2000).
222
130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
223
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492–93.
216
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decisions required some post-disposition review of the circumstances relating to the display.224 So long as adequate measures were taken to ensure
that a reasonable observer would not attribute the post-disposition display
to the government, Establishment Clause concerns were considered settled.
Against expectations that Buono would clarify the constitutional validity of settlement-by-disposition, the Court issued a fractured opinion that set
forth no categorical rule.225 Buono arose from some rather unusual circumstances. The case involves a congressional, rather than a local, disposition
of public parkland. In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected a memorial to fallen service members in the form of a wooden Latin cross set atop a
rock outcropping in the Mojave National Preserve located in southeastern
California.226 Although the site once had a plaque commemorating veterans, the cross involved in the dispute sat alone on the property.227
Although the cross is between five and eight feet tall and is located in a
remote part of the 1.6-million-acre preserve, it can be seen from a secondary road.228 In 1999, the National Park Service (NPS) considered removing the cross.229 The following year, Congress prohibited the NPS from
spending any federal funds to do so.230 In 2001, Frank Buono, a retired National Park Service employee, filed suit claiming that the display of the
cross violated the Establishment Clause.231 In January 2002, Congress designated the cross and any acreage associated with it as a national war memorial, directed the Secretary of the Interior to expend up to $10,000 to
acquire a replica of the original cross and its memorial plaque, and further
directed the Secretary to install a memorial plaque at a suitable location.232
In July 2002, the district court permanently enjoined the federal government from permitting the display of the cross.233 Three months later,
Congress enacted a statute barring the use of federal funds to “dismantle national memorials commemorating United States participation in World War
I.”234 While an appeal from the district court’s injunction was pending—in
224

See id. at 497; see also, e.g., Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, La Crosse Aerie 1254, 395
F.3d 693, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2005) (examining the post-disposition physical characteristics of the monument and their effect on public perception regarding ownership and endorsement).
225
See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803.
226
Id. at 1811.
227
Id. at 1812. Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the cross was stolen from the site. Randal
C. Archibold, Cross at Center of Legal Dispute Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/us/12cross.html.
228
Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811–12.
229
Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom., Salazar v.
Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 18 (2010).
230
See Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-230.
231
Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 371 F.3d 543
(9th Cir. 2004).
232
Act of Jan. 10, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a), (c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79.
233
See Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
234
Act of Oct. 23, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551.
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fact, one month after oral argument but before the appellate decision was
issued235—Congress enacted legislation ordering the Department of the Interior to convey the land upon which the cross is displayed to the Veterans of
Foreign Wars in exchange for a privately owned five-acre parcel of land located elsewhere in the preserve.236 The transfer statute provided that “[i]f
the Secretary determines that the conveyed property is no longer being
maintained as a war memorial, the property shall revert to the ownership of
the United States.”237
Without deciding whether the proposed land swap would avoid any
constitutional controversy, the Ninth Circuit held that the display as it then
existed violated the Establishment Clause.238 On remand, the district court
held that the proposed disposition was “an attempt by the government to
evade the permanent injunction” enjoining display of the cross and, in any
event, did not cure the Establishment Clause violation.239 The district court
permanently enjoined the government from effectuating the transfer.240
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.241 It held that the disposition violated the
Establishment Clause in both form and substance. The court concluded that
the various congressional statutes, which designated the land as a national
memorial, provided for federal management and supervision of the site, and
secured an easement for certain purposes, evinced post-disposition “continuing government control” of the property.242 Relying on Hampton and
Grubbs, the court construed the reversionary provision as granting the government an automatic property interest if the property ceased to be used as a
war memorial, which was comprised “at this juncture . . . [of] the cross itself.”243 According to the court, these facts demonstrated that the organization was a “straw” purchaser through which the government sought to
circumvent the injunction.244 It concluded that the government’s “longstanding efforts to preserve and maintain the cross” led to the “undeniable
conclusion that the government’s purpose in this case is to evade the injunc-

235

See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007).
Act of Sept. 30, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a)–(b), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100.
237
Id. § 8121(e).
238
Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
239
Buono v. Norton (Buono III), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom.,
Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom., Salazar v. Buono
(Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
240
Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
241
Buono V, 527 F.3d at 783.
242
See id. at 779.
243
Id. at 780. The court also noted that the means of transfer did not comport with federal laws and
regulations governing federal land exchanges: no hearing was held, bidding was not open to the general
public, and the appropriations bill directed that the land be conveyed to the organization that originally
installed the Latin cross on the property. Id. at 781.
244
Id. at 781–82.
236
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tion and keep the cross in place.”245 The court held that the proposed disposition, which would “leave a little donut hole of land with a cross in the
midst of a vast federal preserve,” did not settle or avoid the Establishment
Clause violation.246 Accordingly, it upheld the district court’s injunction ordering that the cross not be displayed.247
In a fractured decision,248 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court for a determination as to whether the land transfer statute constituted an independent violation of the Establishment Clause rather than
merely an attempted evasion of the district court’s injunction.249 Justice
Kennedy, writing for himself and the Chief Justice, and joined in part by
Justice Alito, held that the district court had erred by failing to determine
whether the land transfer statute settled the establishment controversy by
eliminating any endorsement of religion by the federal government.250 The
plurality strongly hinted that settlement-by-disposition had occurred. Justice Kennedy questioned whether the “reasonable observer” standard continued to be the appropriate framework after the subject property had been
privatized, but ultimately opined that on remand the district court would
need to determine whether a reasonable observer’s impression would have
changed once he became aware of Congress’s “policy of accommodation”
represented by the land transfer statute.251 He also suggested that after the
disposition the cross conveyed a secular message of respect for fallen soldiers.252
Justice Kennedy disclaimed any attempt to state “categorical rules” regarding settlement-by-disposition.253 However, his opinion strongly urged
the district court to defer to “Congress’s prerogative to balance opposing interests and its institutional competence”254 and “to consider less drastic relief than complete invalidation of the land-transfer statute.”255 The plurality
appeared quite sympathetic to Congress’s “dilemma” and its effort to accommodate both the terms of the injunction and the sentiments of those for
whom the cross was a secular token of appreciation for fallen soldiers.256 In
a separate concurrence, Justice Alito opined that the Court should have de-
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Id. at 782.
Id. at 768, 782.
247
Id. at 783.
248
Six separate opinions were filed in the case. See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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Id. at 1819–20.
250
Id. at 1818–21.
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Id. at 1819–20.
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See id. at 1820.
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Id.
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Id. at 1817.
255
Id. at 1820.
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See id. at 1817 (noting Congress’s “dilemma” and observing that “Congress adopted a policy
with respect to land it now owns in order to resolve a specific controversy”).
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cided that Congress had legitimately and finally settled the establishment
claim through the land transfer statute.257
In the principal dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor, argued that the district court had properly determined that
the land transfer statute did not cure the Establishment Clause violation
identified by the district court.258 The dissenters argued that the land transfer statute “was designed specifically to foster the display of the cross.”259
They opined that transfer of the land into private hands would not end government endorsement of the cross, a plainly religious symbol, because after
the transfer a reasonable observer would still view the presence of the cross
as an official endorsement of religion “notwithstanding that the name ha[d]
changed on the title to a small patch of underlying land.”260 According to
the dissenters, a reasonable observer would know that the cross was once on
public land, that the government had been enjoined from displaying the
cross, that Congress transferred the land and the cross to a private purchaser
in order to preserve the display, and that the government retained a reversionary interest in the land.261 Moreover, the dissenters claimed that the
government’s endorsement was ongoing because “the purpose of the transfer [wa]s to preserve [the] display” of the cross.262 Congress, they argued,
had “singled out that cross for special treatment, and [had] affirmatively
commanded that the cross must remain.”263
Unlike the plurality, the dissenters gave little weight to Congress’s
supposed desire to resolve controversy or avoid offense. The government,
they opined, cannot “decline to cure an Establishment Clause violation in
order to avoid offense.”264 Nor were they inclined to defer to Congress’s institutional capabilities or considered judgment, especially given that the
land transfer statute was buried in an appropriations bill and “undertaken
without any deliberation whatsoever.”265 Finally, the dissenters opined that
there was no need for the district court to consider less drastic remedies,
such as the erection of fences and disclaimers at the site.266 None of this
would change the facts that the land had been “transferred in a manner favoring the cross and [that] the cross would remain designated as a national
memorial.”267
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

Id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1830–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1831.
Id. at 1832.
Id. at 1833–34.
Id. at 1832–33, 1837–40.
Id. at 1834.
Id. at 1839 n.11.
See id. at 1840.
Id. at 1841.
Id.
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Owing to the fractured nature of the decision in Buono, it is difficult to
glean much guidance from it with regard to the constitutionality of settlement-by-disposition. However, although there are no categorical rules,
there are strong hints in the plurality opinion that at least three justices are
inclined to treat property dispositions deferentially, even in a case bearing
some unusual indicia of favoritism toward a religious symbol.268 Although
deference to Congress certainly played some role, it is unclear to what extent the plurality decision rests upon the fact that congressional as opposed
to local legislation was at issue. The Buono plurality strongly suggested
that there may be few, if any, limits on settlement-by-disposition in religious display cases.
B. Privatizing Main Street
Establishment controversies involving public properties are not limited
to religious displays. As discussed in Part III, officials increasingly have
sold public forum properties to private purchasers.269 Religious institutions,
like any other private actor, are entitled to bid for and purchase public properties. Unlike sales to other private actors, though, sales to religious purchasers raise potential Establishment Clause concerns. When the subject
property is a traditional public forum, the disposition may be suspect on
free speech grounds as well.
In 1999, Salt Lake City, Utah, sold a block-long section of Main Street
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS).270 The city initially retained an easement on the property for public access and passage.271
LDS imposed various speech restrictions on the easement, which were challenged as violations of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.272 After the Tenth Circuit held that the easement was a public forum and that
LDS’s content-based restrictions on speech could not be enforced, the city
sold the easement to LDS for fair market value.273
Plaintiffs then challenged the sale of the easement to LDS on both free
speech and establishment grounds. The speech claim is discussed in Part III
below.274 The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the establishment claim.275 As the Supreme Court did in Palmer, the court expressed
268

It is possible that Justices Scalia and Thomas, who concurred in the judgment on the ground that
the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the land transfer statute, id. at 1824 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring), might have voted in favor of the disposition had the issue, in their view, been properly before the Court.
269
See infra Part III.C.
270
Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005).
271
Id.
272
Id. at 1253.
273
Id.; see First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002).
274
See infra Part III.C.
275
Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1258–62.
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“reluctan[ce] to attribute unconstitutional motives” to the city and deferred
to its characterization of the transaction as bona fide.276 It also concluded
that there were several secular purposes for the sale. In addition to receipt
of fair market value for the land, the court observed that the sale to LDS allowed the city to “extricate itself from perceived entanglement with the
Church and thereby reduce public outcry by eliminating joint ownership” of
the property.277 The court also cited resolution of the protracted legal contest regarding the property and avoidance of litigation as valid secular purposes supporting the disposition.278
The transaction did not have the effect of endorsing religion, the court
said, because it merely allowed LDS “to advance itself” by allowing it to
purchase the easement parcel.279 The court characterized the sale as “a
transfer of property from the government to a private entity, which happens
to be a church.”280 As in the public display cases, plaintiffs challenged the
sale as a sham transaction intended to endorse LDS’s religious message.281
The court noted that plaintiffs had not come forward with any evidence
suggesting that the transaction was a sham; it observed that the city did not
retain any significant interest in the property and that there was no evidence
of improper motivation.282
As in the religious symbol cases, the court concluded that the disposition of the easement allowed the city to divest itself of any involvement and
thereby avoid any constitutional difficulties. The ultimate effect was to
transfer ownership of an entire portion of the city’s Main Street to a religious purchaser. As a result of the title transfer, any speech, association, or
conduct that does not comport with LDS’s views now may be lawfully suppressed in what was once a traditional public forum.283
C. Publicization and Religious Symbols
Privatization is not the only means of property disposition that may be
used to settle establishment controversies. Rather than privatize the property in question, the government may take possession of both the property
and any religious symbol on it. This inverse privatization, or publicization,
276

Id. at 1259 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–95 (1983)); see Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971).
277
Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1259.
278
Id. at 1260.
279
Id. at 1261.
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Id.
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Id.
282
Id. at 1262.
283
Recently, for example, two men were detained and cited for trespassing after kissing each other
on the LDS property. Erin Alberty, Police Report on Men’s Plaza Kiss Released, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
July 17, 2009. The incident sparked a public protest. See Ben Fulton, Kissing Protest Brings Cheers,
Jeers, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 19, 2009.
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can be accomplished either by purchase or by the use of eminent domain.284
Utilizing these processes, governments can embrace rather than attempt to
distance themselves from the subject properties and symbols. Thus, along
with private law mechanisms, officials may use public law principles and
powers to avoid constitutional claims. Publicization raises the specter of
governmental endorsement of religion. Assuming the post-disposition display comports with the Establishment Clause, however, publicization may
represent another means of settlement-by-disposition.
The protracted controversy over the display of a religious symbol on
Mt. Soledad in San Diego, California, serves as one example. A fortythree-foot-high Latin cross sits atop Mt. Soledad in a public park near San
Diego, California.285 The Mt. Soledad cross, which is surrounded by more
than 2000 plaques paying tribute to war veterans, was the center of a decades-long legal controversy.286 At one point in the cross’s protracted legal
history, the Ninth Circuit held that the display violated the California Constitution’s prohibition on religious preference.287 The court affirmed an injunction forbidding the city from maintaining the cross on public land.288
In response to the injunction, the city sold approximately 222 square
feet of land under the cross to the same private association that had erected
it decades earlier.289 Although the sale was for fair market value, the city
did not solicit bids or proposals from other prospective purchasers.290 After
a district court invalidated the sale, in part on the ground that the parcel sold
was too small to remedy the constitutional violation, the city again sought
to dispose of the land beneath the cross.291 It expanded the size of the parcel
to 0.509 acres and solicited bids.292 The bid packages were required to contain, among other things, a detailed proposal for “the maintenance of an historic war memorial.”293 The association’s bid was again accepted.294
The en banc Ninth Circuit held that the second sale also violated the
California Constitution.295 The court held that by indicating that the cross
itself would be conveyed along with the land and that the purchaser could
satisfy the condition that the site be used as a war memorial by keeping the
cross in its present location, the city had granted an impermissible “prefer284

See generally Tebbe, supra note 11 (noting the government’s use of privatization and publicization to avoid establishment and free speech claims).
285
Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202–03 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
286
Id. at 1203.
287
See Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993).
288
Id. at 1520.
289
Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
290
Id. at 1126.
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Id. at 1126–27.
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Id. at 1127.
293
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
294
Id. at 1128.
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Id. at 1133.
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ence” or benefit to a distinctly religious message in violation of the state
constitution.296 In essence, the court concluded that purchasers who intended to maintain the cross as part of the war memorial had been given an
economic advantage, pursuant to the terms of the sale, in comparison to
those who may have wished to remove the cross. The latter purchasers,
said the court, would have been required to absorb the costs of removing
the cross and constructing an alternative memorial.297 This, then, was a case
in which unusual circumstances overcame the presumption that the disposition was valid.
The court left it to the parties and the lower court to determine an appropriate remedy.298 After further debate and consideration by numerous
parties—lower courts, San Diego residents (in local referenda), and local
public officials—failed to resolve the controversy,299 Congress intervened.
In 2004, Congress passed a resolution recognizing the Mt. Soledad property
site as a national war memorial and agreeing to accept the property if the
city chose to donate it to the federal government.300 After efforts to effectuate a donation were blocked by a California trial court,301 in 2006 Congress
enacted a law taking the property by eminent domain.302
A federal district court held that neither the taking nor the preservation
of the Mt. Soledad memorial violated the Establishment Clause.303 Deferring to Congress’s findings and expressing reluctance to impute any illicit
motive to it, the court held that the purposes of the taking were to preserve a
war memorial and to settle a protracted local controversy.304 The reasonable
observer, said the court, would regard Congress’s decision to acquire the
land as “an effort to preserve an important regional landmark.”305 For similar reasons, the court held that the continued presence of the monument did
not violate the Establishment Clause.306
The disposition of the Mt. Soledad cross suggests that where the government does not own the property upon which a religious symbol sits, it
may be able to settle constitutional objections by acquiring the property and
adopting the symbol. Where federal law is more permissive than local law
with regard to religious displays or where other means of disposition have
failed, settlement-by-acquisition may present a viable option. Whether
296

Id. at 1132–33.
Id.
298
Id. at 1134.
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See Paulson v. Abdelnour, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 580–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (recounting the
factual and legal history relating to the subject property and the cross).
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Act of Dec. 8, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 116(a), (b), 118 Stat. 2809, 3346.
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Congress ought to intervene or be invited to participate in local affairs to
this extent raises interesting issues regarding the scope of federal power. At
least insofar as anti-establishment obligations are concerned, however, the
congressional disposition of the Mt. Soledad cross rescued a symbol the
city could not protect through either litigation or privatization. Publicizing
the subject property and attendant symbols in this manner generally will not
save an unadorned religious symbol.307 But it might, as the resolution of the
Mt. Soledad controversy shows, avoid or settle establishment claims in
some cases.
Publicization does not require that officials use their eminent domain
authority. It may result from a range of transactions, including donations
and purchases. Indeed, one of the proposals that preceded the congressional
taking in the Mt. Soledad contest contemplated that the city would donate
the property to the federal government. Like privatization, such dispositions restructure ownership with the apparent goal of removing constitutional concerns. In some senses, privatization and publicization represent
very distinct means of settlement. As Part IV argues, however, both disposition mechanisms raise serious constitutional concerns.
III. PROPERTY DISPOSITION AND EXPRESSIVE LIBERTIES
Freedoms of speech and assembly can also be substantially affected by
settlement-by-disposition. During the past several decades, privatization of
public properties has significantly diminished opportunities for public
speech and assembly.308 As in other constitutional contexts, dispositions affecting speech and assembly have ranged from leases to outright closures.
Governments also have turned to taking ownership of private property in
public fora to settle free speech claims.309 As in the equality and establishment contexts, when First Amendment speech and assembly challenges to
property dispositions have been brought, public officials have argued that
the claims have been extinguished or settled by the dispositions. As in
other constitutional contexts, officials have resorted to property dispositions
307

See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (“I doubt not, for example, that the [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.”); see also Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“[G]overnment speech must comport with the Establishment
Clause.”); id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that government speakers are still bound by
the Establishment Clause).
308
See generally ZICK, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the privatization of public streets, sidewalks,
and other traditional public forum spaces). For a sociological perspective on privatization, in particular
the migration to gated communities, see MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE (2004). Although the discussion will focus on rights of speech and
assembly, the right to petition government for grievances is also implicated in some public property dispositions.
309
See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30 (describing the city’s selective adoption of privately donated monuments).
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in order to settle community disputes, to evade judicial mandates, and on
rare occasions to purposefully suppress civil liberties. The Supreme Court
has offered little guidance regarding the validity of settlement-bydisposition in speech and assembly contexts. Lower courts have adopted
both formal and functional approaches to privatizing dispositions, and the
implications of the evolving government speech doctrine for public forum
properties are not yet clear. In sum, the constitutional and democratic limits
of settlement-by-disposition are as uncertain in the speech and assembly areas as elsewhere.
A. Property Allocation and Public Fora
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,310 a plurality of the
Supreme Court stated that “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”311 The
Hague dictum is the foundation for contemporary standards regarding access to public properties for purposes of speech and assembly.312 Many of
these standards relate to the regulation of expression, rather than the disposition of the property itself, and we need not examine them in detail. However, four general observations regarding speech and assembly on public
properties are relevant to the scope of this Article and form the basis for the
discussion in this Part.
First, with regard to public properties such as parks, streets, and (most)
sidewalks,313 the Supreme Court has stated that “the rights of the State to
limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”314 This limitation is
due in substantial measure to Hague’s recognition of the expressive functions and traditions associated with such properties. In light of these properties’ importance to public speech and assembly, the government may not
prohibit all expression in such fora.315 The First Amendment thus requires
that governments facilitate speech and assembly by making at least some
spaces—traditional public fora—available for such activities. Moreover,
the government may not regulate the content of expression in such places
absent a compelling justification and a demonstration that the regulation is
310

307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
312
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
313
Not all sidewalks are created equal insofar as the First Amendment is concerned. Compare
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 723, 730 (1990) (holding that a postal sidewalk used primarily
for access to a post office building is not a public forum), with United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179
(1983) (holding that public sidewalks near the Supreme Court are within the category of properties that
traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities).
314
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
315
Id.
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narrowly drawn to achieve its end.316 It may, however, generally impose
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.317
Second, despite these limits, governments retain substantial discretion
in terms of the operation, maintenance, and perhaps the disposition of public fora. With regard to any forum that traditionally has not been open to
speech and assembly, but that officials have designated as a forum for such
activities, the Court has stated that officials are “not required to indefinitely
retain the open character of the facility.”318 So long as they do so, however,
officials are required to abide by the standards applicable to traditional public fora.319 Some of the Justices have also indicated that traditional public
forum properties—streets, parks, and sidewalks—may be sold or closed. In
a concurrence joined by three Justices in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, a case involving speech regulations in a public
airport terminal,320 Justice Kennedy stated that “[i]n some sense the government always retains authority to close a public forum, by selling the
property, changing its physical character, or changing its principal use.”321
“Otherwise,” he said, “the State would be prohibited from closing a park, or
eliminating a street or sidewalk, which no one has understood the public forum doctrine to require.”322 These statements suggest that the status of even
a traditional public forum is mutable, either through disposition or substantial physical or functional alteration. The Court has never expressly decided
whether and, if so, under what circumstances officials may constitutionally
dispose of public streets, sidewalks, or parks.
Third, with regard to mutability, while the government may have the
authority to sell, close, or alter public fora, it may not simply demote them,
so to speak, by fiat or legislative pronouncement.323 In United States v.
Grace, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not by statute designate
the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building as nonpublic fora,
thus permitting officials essentially to ban speech and assembly there.324
The Court also held that a traditional public forum “will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property
that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expres316
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Id.
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Id. at 45–46.
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Id. at 46.
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Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
322
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historically been public forums . . . .”); see also Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to
Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 201, 207–13 (2007) (discussing various methods by
which officials have sought to demote public fora).
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461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
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sion.”325 As Justice Kennedy indicated in Lee, to change the property’s forum status, the government must “alter the objective physical character or
uses of the property, and bear the attendant costs.”326
Fourth, the Supreme Court has recently recognized that the government may itself speak in and perhaps through the public forum.327 It may do
so directly, by erecting monuments, placards, or other symbols.328 Or it may
do so by adopting formerly private monuments or symbols as its own,
through donation or perhaps purchase.329 In the latter type of disposition,
transferring title to the government essentially allocates public forum property based upon the government speech principle. The Supreme Court has
held that this type of disposition extinguishes the First Amendment claims
of other speakers with regard to the public space at issue.330
The foregoing are the basic ground rules for public forum dispositions.
Together, they represent the sense in which the government always has authority to dispose of public forum properties. As we shall see, however,
application of these basic rules has proven somewhat difficult in certain
speech and assembly contexts.
B. Leases of Public Forum Property
One area of general agreement across doctrinal areas is that merely
leasing a public property does not settle constitutional claims or concerns.
Recall that during the civil rights era, courts generally held that the mere
leasing of public property did not settle Fourteenth Amendment claims. A
similar rule applies in the speech and assembly contexts.
Courts have been skeptical of claims that lease agreements settle
speech contests involving access to public forum properties. Several courts
have held that a private lessee who polices or regulates speech in a place
that traditionally has functioned as a public street or sidewalk is a state actor
because he is serving a traditional public function, is involved in a symbiotic relationship with a public entity, or both.331
325

Id.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
327
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132, 1138 (2009) (holding that the city’s
adoption of the Ten Commandments and other symbols displayed in a public park extinguished the First
Amendment claims of a private speaker seeking access to the forum).
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Id. at 1132–33.
329
Id. at 1133–34.
330
Id. at 1132.
331
See, e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that airport terminals leased by private parties from the state were the functional equivalent of public streets to which
First Amendment rights applied); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Schrader, 461 F. Supp. 714,
717–18 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that lessees of the Dallas Convention Center, a city-owned facility,
had to comply with the First Amendment); City of Jamestown v. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d 830, 836 (N.D.
1991) (holding that sub-lessees of a shopping mall owned by the city had to satisfy First Amendment
standards for speech regulation on their property); cf. Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61
326
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A good example is Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation,
Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., in which a district court held that the
streets and lanes separating the buildings at Faneuil Hall Marketplace in
Boston, which had been leased to private merchants for a ninety-nine-year
term, remained public fora subject to First Amendment protections.332 Prior
to the lease, the lanes were marked and operated as public streets.333 The
lessees argued that under the Supreme Court’s state action decisions, the
lanes at Faneuil Hall Marketplace were private property to which the First
Amendment did not apply.334 Relying in part on Evans v. Newton (the public park devise case discussed in Part I),335 the district court held that in light
of the public easement encumbering the lanes and the traditional public access to them, the lessees were operating the equivalent of a public park or
policing access to the functional equivalent of a public street.336 The lessees
were thus serving a traditional and exclusive public function. The court
also held that in light of the mutual financial benefits that accrued to the
parties under the long-term lease, the private lessees had entered a “symbiotic relationship” with the city.337 The court went on to hold that the lessee’s restrictions on public protests at Faneuil Hall Marketplace were
required to, but did not, satisfy the First Amendment.338
Faneuil Hall does not necessarily stand for the broad proposition that
all leased public properties on which speech and assembly might occur are
automatically subject to the First Amendment. As in other disposition contexts, much depends on the specific characteristics of the property itself and
the leasing arrangement.339 The subject property in Faneuil Hall was owned
by the city, had traditionally been used as a forum for speech and assembly,
was extensively regulated by the city, was indistinguishable from immediately adjacent public areas, and was subject to a public access easement.
Where a municipality or other public entity not only retains title to
what once functioned as a public forum property, but also is involved in
some mutually beneficial relationship with its private lessees, the First
Amendment likely will apply to the subject property. In order to settle or
avoid First Amendment speech and assembly concerns—or to assure their
(Colo. 1991) (concluding that private lessees had to comply with the speech guarantees of the state constitution).
332
745 F. Supp. 65, 67 n.1, 76 (D. Mass. 1990).
333
Id. at 67 n.1.
334
Id. at 69 (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment did
not apply at a private shopping mall)).
335
See supra notes 27–41 and accompanying text.
336
Faneuil Hall, 745 F. Supp. at 70–71.
337
Id. at 73–74.
338
Id. at 74–76.
339
See, e.g., Garrison v. City of Lakeland, 954 F. Supp. 246, 250 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that union demonstrators did not have the First Amendment right to picket on a road leased from the city which
led to a hospital and functioned primarily as an access road).
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lessees that there are no such concerns—governments are required to divest
themselves more fully of any interest in the subject property.
C. Sales and Substitutions
Suppose, however, that a municipality sells or otherwise completely
privatizes a public forum property. Do these sorts of dispositions settle any
speech and assembly claims or concerns? Owing to the trend toward privatization of public forum properties, this has become a critical question.340
Consistent with the principle stated in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Lee, courts generally have assumed that municipalities always may alter,
sell, or close even traditional public forum properties. They have differed,
however, in the degree of scrutiny they have applied to this particular type
of settlement-by-disposition.
Some courts have taken a very formalistic approach to property sales
and substitutions in speech and assembly contexts. These courts have held
that, so long as the instrument of sale or substitution passes title, any constitutional difficulties have been avoided.341 They have not been willing to
look behind or beyond the terms of deeds and other instruments. Thus,
even where the property continues to function as a traditional public forum
after disposition, some courts have refused to impose First Amendment requirements. Recall that some courts adopted a similar formalism with respect to certain dispositions in the equal protection context.
Other courts, perhaps troubled by the apparent breadth of discretion
granted to officials by the Lee dictum, have imposed some limits on settlement-by-sale. As discussed below, these courts have applied a more functional standard to post-disposition properties in order to determine whether
the transaction has in fact settled First Amendment speech and assembly
concerns. The functional approach is based on an examination of a variety
of factors relating to the subject property. It asks whether, after disposition,
the property still functions as a traditional public forum. If so, First
Amendment requirements continue to apply. Although the functional approach has been somewhat effective at constraining officials’ discretion to
dispose of public forum properties, the approach generally allows officials
and private purchasers to settle constitutional claims by altering the physical appearance of the subject properties or making aesthetic adjustments.
340

See ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases addressing privatization in the First Amendment context); Chi. Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth.,
150 F.3d 695, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting “a nationwide trend toward the privatization of public property”).
341
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Reber, 454 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (C.D. Cal.
1978) (holding that a portion of a sidewalk previously owned by the city but vacated to a private owner
was not a public forum, despite the fact that it was “the functional equivalent of a public street”); S.O.C.,
Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d 243, 246 (Nev. 2001) (holding that reservation of a public easement for pedestrian access did not convert private sidewalks into a public forum).
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Privatization of traditional public forum properties sometimes occurs
as a result of construction and other municipal projects. For example, in
one case the Venetian Casino Resort, which is located on the Las Vegas
Strip, entered an agreement with the Nevada Department of Transportation
that allowed it to demolish an existing public sidewalk fronting the casino.342 Under the agreement, the Venetian was required to construct and
maintain a private sidewalk connecting the remaining public sidewalks located on either side of its property and to dedicate a right-of-way to the Department of Transportation.343 After the sidewalk had been completed,
county officials issued a permit for a union protest on the sidewalk in front
of the Venetian.344 The Venetian attempted to have the protesters removed,
but the District Attorney’s Office declined to issue citations or make arrests.345 The Venetian filed a federal lawsuit against the county, alleging
that it had taken private property in order to create a public forum.346 The
casino also sought a declaratory judgment that the replacement sidewalk
was not a public forum and an injunction requiring that the county recognize and enforce the Venetian’s right to exclude the protesters.347
The Ninth Circuit held that the replacement sidewalk, which was actually located on a different parcel than the public sidewalk it had replaced,
was a public forum to which the union protesters had a right of access under
the First Amendment (subject, of course, to appropriate time, place, and
manner regulations).348 In making that determination, the court analyzed
several factors: the historical use of the public sidewalk that had been replaced and its public forum status; the location of the now-private parcel
and its relationship to the general pedestrian grid; the substitute parcel’s
character and use after disposition; the sidewalk’s dedication to public use
for purposes of unobstructed pedestrian access;349 and the lack of any aesthetic, environmental, or architectural distinction between the sidewalk in
front of the Venetian and the connecting public sidewalks.350 The court
concluded that it was “apparent that the function of the replacement side342

Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 939–40 (9th Cir.

2001).
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Id. at 940.
Id.
345
Id. at 940–41.
346
Id. at 941.
347
Id. Although the county defended the suit, it ultimately took no position regarding whether the
sidewalk was a public forum for First Amendment purposes. Id. at 941 n.4.
348
See id. at 942, 948.
349
A recorded servitude on the parcel provided that the Venetian, its successors, and assigns dedicated the parcel to public use for the purpose of unobstructed pedestrian access. Id. at 943. The court
said that the servitude operated as either a restrictive covenant or an affirmative easement. Id. at 946.
However the servitude was characterized, the court concluded that it operated to render the parcel public, not private, property. Id. at 945–46 (“Property that is dedicated to public use is no longer truly private.”).
350
See id. at 943–46.
344
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walk on the Venetian’s property was to be the same as the former public
sidewalk in front of the Venetian and the sidewalks connecting on either
side of the Venetian property.”351 It emphasized that there was nothing to
indicate to pedestrians that they were entering a private enclave when they
used the Venetian’s sidewalk.352
Despite the fact that the Venetian had legal title to the sidewalk parcel,
the court held that the sidewalk remained subject to First Amendment requirements. The fact that the property remained open to the public on essentially the same terms as the public sidewalk it had replaced meant that
the First Amendment continued to apply even though the Venetian itself
was a private actor. The Ninth Circuit did not make clear whether, through
substantial physical alteration or otherwise, the Venetian could ever change
the public forum status of its private parcel. The court seemed to suggest
that the replacement sidewalk was unique and perhaps immutably public:
“Even if the Venetian were to close its doors or to be converted into a
members-only club or some other nonpublic enterprise, members of the
public would still have the recorded right to pass across the Venetian’s
property along Las Vegas Boulevard and to express themselves as they do
so with the same freedom as on any public sidewalk.”353 Two factors
seemed to be critical to preserving the newly constructed sidewalk as a traditional public forum. The first was the unique geography—a replacement
sidewalk that was sandwiched between two public sidewalks and thus critical to passage. The second was the recorded public easement.
The Tenth Circuit applied a similar functional approach in a pair of
cases involving the sale of a portion of Main Street in Salt Lake City, Utah,
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS).354 As discussed
earlier, Salt Lake City closed and sold a portion of the Main Street parcel355
but initially retained an easement for public access and passage over a portion of the parcel.356 The reservation of easement contained a number of restrictions on expressive activity on the parcel and gave LDS the right to
exclude anyone who engaged in any of the prohibited conduct.357 It also
contained a right of reverter, which provided that if LDS did not use the
property for the purpose set forth in the deed, the easement ownership
would revert to the city.358 LDS made several aesthetic and other changes to
Main Street Plaza in order to convert it to an ecclesiastical park, including
351

Id. at 942.
See id. at 945.
353
Id. at 948.
354
See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2005); First
Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002).
355
First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1117.
356
Id. at 1118.
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Id. at 1118–19.
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Id. at 1119.
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the addition of “planters, benches, and waterfalls, a large reflecting pool,
and changes in grade.”359 The district court held that in light of these
changes in function and appearance, the easement property was no longer a
public forum.360
The Tenth Circuit reversed.361 The court began with some general observations regarding property dispositions and the First Amendment. The
court observed that “a deed does not insulate government action from constitutional review”; thus, formal title to the land was not dispositive.362 The
court also rejected the argument that an easement was not a significant
enough property interest to merit public forum analysis under the First
Amendment.363 To the contrary, said the court, some public easements had
been held to constitute Fifth Amendment takings.364 The court indicated,
however, that not every easement would constitute a public forum for purposes of the First Amendment.365 That determination would depend on “the
characteristics of the easement, the practical considerations of applying forum principles, and the particular context the case presents.”366
In light of the city’s clear purpose to retain public access to and use of
the easement parcel, the property’s relationship to the general downtown
pedestrian transportation grid, and the fact that the easement was open to
the public, the court concluded that the easement “share[d] many of the
most important features of sidewalks that are traditional public fora.”367 The
court further noted that the easement parcel had traditionally been open not
only to public use but also to expressive activities in particular.368 Further,
although LDS had made certain physical alterations to the property, the
court concluded that they were not sufficient to substantially alter the use of
the property and thus demote the easement parcel from a traditional to a
nonpublic forum.369 The court said that while the government has the power
to change the status of even a well-established public forum, it not only
must alter the physical characteristics of the property but also must bear any

359

Id.
First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1171 (D. Utah 2001),
rev’d, 308 F.3d 1114.
361
First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1117.
362
Id. at 1122 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000) (noting
that “easements to which government is party are subject to the Constitution”)).
363
Id.
364
Id.; see, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (holding that a public easement
constituted a regulatory taking).
365
See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1124–25.
366
Id. at 1123 n.5 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–77 (1998)).
367
Id. at 1128.
368
See id. at 1129–30.
369
See id. at 1130.
360
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attendant costs.370 Here, the city had retained a significant property interest
after the sale; “[i]n effect, the City want[ed] to have its cake and eat it
too . . . .”371 According to the Tenth Circuit, the First Amendment does not
permit this type of arrangement.372 In explaining its decision to apply the
First Amendment to the privatized easement parcel, the court noted the increasing importance of preserving public spaces open to expressive activities, particularly in downtown areas.373
In a sequence of events reminiscent of the Baconsfield saga discussed
in Part I and the Buono case discussed in Part II, following the Tenth Circuit’s decision, Salt Lake City sold the easement to LDS in return for just
over two acres of land in a low-income neighborhood and a $5 million recreation center to be built on the land.374 This time, the settlement agreement
provided that there was to be no right of public access or passage with regard to Main Street Plaza.375 However, the city did retain a right of re-entry
that allowed it to reclaim the public easement should LDS fail to maintain
the plaza it had constructed on the former Main Street as “landscaped
space.”376
The Tenth Circuit held that the city now had sufficiently divested itself
of any interest in the property to avert the transfer of any First Amendment
speech and assembly obligations to LDS.377 It concluded that LDS was not
a state actor since it was neither performing a public function by maintaining and determining access to the plaza, now a wholly private property, nor
involved in any symbiotic relationship with the city.378 Relying on Justice
Kennedy’s observations in Lee, the court noted that the government always
retained the options to close a public forum by selling the property or to
change a property’s status by altering its physical character or uses.379 The
court held that LDS had made sufficient physical changes to the plaza property as a whole to demonstrate that it was privately owned, including posting signs at all entrances to the plaza and erecting planters and other
barriers.380 Applying the functional approach, the court concluded that the
plaza’s walkways did not constitute public fora.381 It noted that the primary
370

Id. at 1131 (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 700 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
371
Id.
372
Id. The court went on to invalidate the speech restrictions imposed under the easement and the
reservation. Id. at 1131–33.
373
Id. at 1131.
374
Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2005).
375
Id.
376
Id.
377
See id. at 1255.
378
See id.
379
See id. at 1255–56.
380
Id.
381
See id. at 1257–58.
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purpose of the plaza was to serve as an ecclesiastical park, that there was no
public servitude that ran with the plaza property, and that the plaza was not
seamlessly connected to any public sidewalks.382
Finally, the court discussed the fact that the city had retained a right of
re-entry requiring that the plaza be maintained as a landscaped space.383 It
reasoned that this reversionary interest was not a present estate and thus
was insufficient to render the plaza a public forum.384 The court distinguished Hampton and Grubbs,385 which, as discussed in Part I, held that the
retention of a possibility of reverter was perhaps the most important factor
in determining whether a disposition settled equality claims.386 The court
(incorrectly at least as to Hampton) said that these earlier cases had involved close post-disposition relationships between the government and the
purchasers and that the subject properties served the same primary function
post-sale as they had pre-sale.387 Since these factors were not present with
regard to the plaza, the court concluded that Hampton and Grubbs did not
apply.388
The property dispositions described above represent only a small fraction of the public space that has been recently privatized. It is likely that
most such dispositions have received no First Amendment scrutiny at all.
On the occasions when private speakers have challenged property dispositions as violating speech and assembly rights, courts increasingly have scrutinized the details of the transfer instrument and the character of the postdisposition property.389 These cases suggest that a carefully crafted disposition instrument that contains no recorded public easement and prescribes
modest physical and aesthetic alterations generally will extinguish First
Amendment speech and assembly claims. Although some courts have
noted the precipitous decline in public forum spaces, particularly in urban

382

See id. at 1258.
See id. at 1256–57.
384
Id. at 1257.
385
Id.
386
See supra notes 107–28 and accompanying text.
387
Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1257. In Hampton, there was no close relationship between
the municipality and the purchasers of its golf courses; the court relied almost entirely on the right of
reverter in finding state action. See Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
388
Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1257.
389
In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 494–95 (7th Cir. 2000), reasoning, based on the historical use, the dedication
of the property to public use, and the physical location of the property, that the parcel was a public forum for First Amendment purposes, and Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir.
1993), rejecting the city’s argument that a portion of a public park was “semi-private.” However, consider Hawkins v. City of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999), holding that a pedestrian walkway in a city galleria, located on the site of a former public street, had been converted to a nonpublic
forum.
383
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areas, they have thus far been able to do relatively little to reverse the decline.390
D. Closure and Vacation of Public Access
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lee suggested that officials had the discretion to close public forum properties.391 Rather than selling or physically
altering public forum property, officials might simply vacate any rights of
public access or destroy the subject property, thereby effectively closing it
to public access. What, if any, limits do the First Amendment’s speech and
assembly clauses impose on this type of disposition?392
The Supreme Court has never addressed a public forum closure. At
least insofar as they are represented in reported cases, outright closures of
public forum properties appear to be rare. One example is Thomason v.
Jernigan, where local officials vacated a public right-of-way to a cul-de-sac
in front of an abortion clinic.393 The clinic had been the target of several
public protests, and the city claimed that it had difficulty controlling crowds
and traffic in and around the cul-de-sac.394 It did not appear, however, that
the local police had attempted to enforce existing traffic or other local
laws.395 The record, which included testimony at the public hearing on the
property vacation, showed that the disposition was directly linked to the
demonstrations.396 The court observed that the vacation had essentially
converted a traditional public forum that had been used for protest activity
into private property.397 The question, according to the court, was “whether
that action constitutes the impermissible destruction of a public forum,”
subject to First Amendment review.398
Relying on Grace and other public forum cases, the court appeared to
adopt a presumption that any property disposition that destroys a traditional

390

See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If this trend
of privatization continues—and we have no reason to doubt that it will—citizens will find it increasingly
difficult to exercise their First Amendment rights to free speech, as the fora where expressive activities
are protected dwindle.”).
391
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
392
This concern extends to contexts other than the traditional public forum. See, e.g., Rhames v.
City of Biddeford, 204 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50–53 (D. Me. 2002) (concluding that the temporary closure of a
public access television channel did not violate the First Amendment, but declining to decide whether
permanent closure might do so).
393
770 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (E.D. Mich. 1991). The city retained only an easement for utilities. Id.
394
Id. at 1197–98.
395
See id. at 1203.
396
See id. at 1198–99 (describing municipal reports that had identified the protests as the impetus
for the city’s decision to vacate the right-of-way).
397
Id. at 1200.
398
Id.
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public forum violates the First Amendment.399 It ultimately held that the
vacation was an impermissible content-based disposition and, in the alternative, that even if it was deemed a content-neutral disposition, the city had
failed to satisfy the requirement that it be narrowly tailored.400 Although the
court acknowledged that precedents such as Palmer rendered the city’s subjective “motives” largely, if not wholly, irrelevant, it repeatedly referred to
evidence of the city’s intent or purpose to suppress the clinic protesters’
speech.401 Ultimately, however, the court said that the case turned on the effect of the property disposition.402 It concluded that despite the city’s proffer of content-neutral justifications and despite the fact that no member of
the public henceforth would have access to the cul-de-sac, the vacation of
the public right-of-way effectively discriminated against a particular group
of protesters in violation of the First Amendment.403
Thomason bears more than a passing resemblance to Palmer, which
upheld the closure of the public pools after an integration decree had been
entered.404 In contrast to Palmer, however, Thomason refused to defer to
the explanations proffered by local officials for their decision to vacate. Indeed, as noted, the court appeared to apply a presumption against the disposition of traditional public forum properties. The result in Thomason was
colored by the city’s rather obvious content discrimination. Insofar as it
stands merely for the proposition that the government cannot close or vacate public access to a public forum for content-discriminatory reasons,
Thomason breaks no new ground. If, however, Thomason’s apparent presumption were to apply even to dispositions effected for content-neutral
reasons, it would substantially qualify the proposition that “[i]n some sense
the government always retains authority to close a public forum.”405
E. Government Ownership and Government Speech
Some free speech claims can also be settled or extinguished through
publicization of property rather than privatization or closure. Publicization
is a different kind of public-space-allocating disposition. It entails not the
disposition of the underlying property, which is already owned or held in
trust by the government, but rather the adoption or purchase of private
399

See id. at 1202 (“The vacation of an easement that transforms a public street and sidewalk into
private property is almost prima facie evidence that the City’s action was not narrowly drawn.”).
400
See id. at 1201–03.
401
See id. at 1201 (finding that while the city “claim[ed] that it vacated the cul-de-sac solely to
regulate conduct and control traffic problems[,] . . . the record clearly show[ed] that the conduct and
traffic problems to be regulated [we]re the plaintiffs’ protest activities”).
402
See id. at 1200 (acknowledging that, under Palmer, “the Court should not engage in a search for
the motives of legislators, but for an inevitable unconstitutional effect resulting from their actions”).
403
See id. at 1201.
404
See discussion supra notes 137–60 and accompanying text.
405
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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speech by the government. The adoption or purchase of the speech in question purportedly settles any competing access claims by other private
speakers.
This was the means of settlement at issue in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum.406 Summum held that a city was not required, under the Free
Speech Clause, to accept a private religious monument for permanent display in a public park where a city-owned Ten Commandments monument
(along with other displays) was already located.407 The Court reasoned that
the public monuments already on display in the park, which had been donated to the city by private parties, were a form of government speech and
thus were not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.408 The
means of transfer in Summum was somewhat similar to the taking described
earlier in the establishment context.409 In this case, the transfer of ownership of the Ten Commandments monument from a private party to the city
was held to extinguish any free speech claims.410 The transformation of private speech into government speech effectively displaced the public forum
doctrine.411
Summum is disconcerting in part because it suggests the possibility that
the government speech principle might be used to effect an end-run around
the Establishment Clause. But Summum raises serious free speech concerns
as well. Summum treats the public square as an instrument of governmental
speech, a location that exists to facilitate the government’s own messages.412 The notion that the public forum exists to convey governmental
messages appears to turn the justification for the public forum—facilitation
of the public’s speech and assembly—on its head. Summum makes clear
that governments are permitted to commandeer portions of the public
square for their own permanent displays, to choose which displays (including perhaps religious ones) they will present to the public, and to insist on
exclusive speech rights in some locations.413 Although a government
406

129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
Id. at 1129.
408
See id. at 1134.
409
See supra notes 285–306 and accompanying text.
410
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
411
See id. at 1133. This is yet another context in which public forum principles have been deemed
inapposite in situations where speakers seek access to publicly controlled facilities. See, e.g., United
States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (holding that public forum principles were
out of place in a public library context).
412
See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (“Public parks are often closely identified in the public mind
with the government unit that owns the land.”); id. at 1134 (observing that public parks “play an important role in defining the identity that a city projects to its own residents and to the outside world”).
413
This is not to suggest that the specific holding in Summum was wrong. After all, it would be impractical indeed to permit a permanent monument free-for-all in public parks and plazas. But we ought
to recognize that, depending on the development of the government speech principle going forward, settlement-by-adoption (of speech), like settlement-by-disposition more generally, may substantially constrain public speech rights in the public square.
407
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speech disposition does not necessarily settle establishment claims, it extinguishes all competing claims to access under the Free Speech Clause.414
After Summum, officials possess an additional mechanism for settlement-by-disposition. Summum’s impact on public forum properties and
public speech rights is not yet known. At this point, however, it is at least
clear that publicizing private monuments and perhaps other property will alter the allocation of free speech rights in some public forum spaces.
IV. SETTLEMENT-BY-DISPOSITION AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
As we have seen across a range of historical and doctrinal contexts,
dispositions of certain public properties have a significant effect on constitutional liberties. Since the civil rights era, courts and public officials have
tended to view most of these dispositions through the lens of private property law, with governments acting as ordinary sellers or purchasers. This
private law framework has generally obscured the public obligations officials owe when disposing of certain public properties. Governments are
not, of course, ordinary property owners or purchasers. Critical constitutional assets should not be alienated or purchased solely to favor specific
viewpoints, symbols, or sellers. Courts and public officials ought to focus
more directly on the public constitutional obligations that attach to certain
properties subject to disposition.
In an effort to move us away from the private law mindset and to bring
greater coherence to considerations of settlement-by-disposition across doctrinal areas, this Part relies by analogy on the public trust doctrine.415 It argues that governments hold certain public properties in trust for the benefit
of the public. Under the proposed public trust model, in order to constitutionally dispose of certain public properties officials would have to comply
with trusteeship duties that I will label fair dealing, preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants. Although courts have not used these
specific labels, those that have placed some limits on settlement-bydisposition have invoked similar ideas. However, as we have seen, judicial
review of settlement-by-disposition has not been uniformly protective of
public trust interests. Thinking in terms of public trust duties may help
courts and officials work through the constitutional implications of settlement-by-disposition. Ultimately, the goal is for public officials to act as re414

Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137.
As will become apparent, the analogy is loose. I do not contend that the public properties under
consideration here should be governed by the public trust doctrine that has been applied to natural resources. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (concluding that states hold title
to submerged lands in trust for the benefit of the people); see generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (discussing the origins and operation of public trust doctrine). Nevertheless, the public trust analogy provides a useful framework for conceptualizing and articulating some proposed limits to settlement-bydisposition.
415
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sponsible stewards of public properties that they hold in trust for the benefit
of the people and to enter into constitutional settlements.
A. (Discretionary) Property Allocations and (Mandatory) Constitutional
Rights
As the description and analysis of settlement-by-disposition shows, no
bright-line rule can resolve the fundamental conflict between the governmental power to dispose of (i.e., sell or purchase) public properties and the
constitutional liberties that cannot exist without access to them. As the civil
rights era first demonstrated, settlement-by-disposition raises a fundamental
conflict between what is generally viewed as discretionary power to allocate
and dispose of public properties and the seemingly mandatory nature of
constitutional rights. As Parts II and III showed, this fundamental tension
has resurfaced in contemporary First Amendment contexts. It has mainly
arisen as a result of privatization of public properties. But as we have seen,
public purchasing and taking powers also have raised questions regarding
the legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition.
To hold that government can never dispose of public properties that are
either critically important to constitutional liberties or at the center of an
ongoing constitutional controversy would deprive officials of an aspect of
their traditional authority. Further, as Justices Burger and Blackmun noted
in their Palmer concurrences, such a limitation would require that in some
cases government must maintain public parks, pools, schools, and other
properties in perpetuity. The Constitution has never been interpreted to impose this sort of broad restraint on governmental disposition of public properties. Indeed, since the New Deal, economic decisions of this sort
generally have been reviewed under a mere rationality standard.416 Moreover, in the public forum context, with the possible exception of the requirement that presently existing public streets and parks must be open to
some speech and assembly, the Constitution has not been interpreted to
make property distributions either mandatory or impermissible.417 Undoubtedly, governments also have the general constitutional power to take
or purchase properties.418 In sum, public properties are generally considered
alienable and governments have the authority to add properties to their portfolios.
Governments also have a distinct and substantial interest in pursuing
and achieving constitutional settlements. This interest includes avoidance
416

See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory
State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1544–48 (2008) (describing the “New Deal compromise,” pursuant to
which enactments affecting economic liberties have generally been subjected to rationality review while
measures affecting noneconomic liberties such as free speech have been subjected to heightened judicial
scrutiny).
417
See id. at 1592–94 (discussing the allocation of forum properties).
418
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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of litigation and its attendant costs. Legislative and executive officials, like
their judicial counterparts, must be permitted to avoid constitutional issues
where possible. Bona fide sales and other legitimate property dispositions
may serve this valuable settlement function.
By the same token, a rule of automatic or presumptive validity for
property dispositions would be unworkable and, frankly, unwise. As the
civil rights era disposition cases demonstrated, to hold that the mere fact of
disposition immediately and henceforth settles any constitutional claims
would be to treat certain constitutional liberties—in particular those intimately connected to the subject properties—as wholly discretionary.419 As
Palmer starkly demonstrated, holding that the mere fact of disposition immediately extinguishes any constitutional concerns would grant governments the authority to turn the Constitution on or off at will.420 Indeed, this
is one of the enduring lessons of the civil rights era experience with settlement-by-disposition.
While governments may not have any constitutional obligation to provide schools, streets, and parks in the first place, once they do so, they must
manage and dispose of such properties in a manner that complies with constitutional obligations and respects constitutional guarantees. Although the
point has sometimes been obscured or misunderstood by courts and public
officials, the dispositions themselves are state actions subject to constitutional limitations. Moreover, dispositions such as public purchases or takings are also subject to constitutional limitations. The purchase itself may
be constitutionally or legislatively authorized, but it also must comply with
the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees. Disposition settles
title; it does not, standing alone, settle all constitutional concerns.
B. The Public Trust Model
We need a framework and mechanism for conceptualizing and imposing some limits on settlement-by-disposition. The key is to prevent public
officials from treating public properties as mere disposable assets. Courts
have not failed entirely to recognize the dangers inherent in settlement-bydisposition. We can see this in some civil rights cases rejecting what
seemed to be bona fide sales and in the functional approaches some courts
have adopted in the establishment and speech contexts. But since the civil
rights era, judicial efforts have tended to be ad hoc, reactionary, and uneven
in terms of protecting public access and preserving public spaces. Abney
and Palmer long ago demonstrated the limits of judicial review with regard
to settlement-by-disposition. The plurality opinion in Buono shows that
419

See Seidman, supra note 416, at 1566 (“When property rights are discretionary, free speech
rights tend to become discretionary as well.”).
420
See discussion supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text; cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 765 (2008) (observing that the federal government does not have “the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will” by manipulating territory).
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courts are still inclined to apply a private law approach that presumes that
governments, like private property owners, may generally dispose of properties notwithstanding public constitutional obligations.421
Restraints on alienation with respect to common resources are sometimes imposed under the public trust doctrine.422 Public officials and courts
might benefit from conceptualizing public properties that are critical to the
exercise of constitutional liberties as critical assets held in trust by governments and thus subject to limited alienability. Under this proposed framework, in order to constitutionally dispose of these properties officials would
have to comply with the proposed duties of fair dealing, preservation of the
public trust, and compliance with constitutional covenants. Ultimately,
public officials would have an obligation with regard to the subject properties to enter constitutional settlements that serve public purposes rather than
private interests, comply with judicial decrees, and respect minority rights.
These trust obligations, which are drawn and synthesized from the collective experience with settlement-by-disposition since the civil rights era,
would apply whether the purported settlement takes the form of privatization or represents a more public law settlement such as a taking. They
would also apply affirmatively—that is, whether or not courts are asked or
even able to enforce them. Collectively, the trust duties and obligations
discussed below would qualify and limit the sense in which governments
“in some sense always” retain the authority to dispose of public properties.423
1. The Nexus Test and the Trust Corpus.—A question immediately
arises regarding which properties constitute the trust corpus. On the one
hand, limits on alienability should not be so broad as to cripple governmental power to dispose of properties and facilities. On the other hand, critical
constitutional properties and public rights of use and enjoyment with regard
to those properties ought to be preserved.
Public property is not, of course, a generic category. Not all property
dispositions implicate substantial constitutional and democratic concerns.
For example, dispositions of surplus properties such as abandoned municipal lots or waste facilities raise no special constitutional concerns. Such
properties are not intricately connected to the exercise of constitutional liberties.
By contrast, public properties that are critical to the exercise of constitutional liberties ought to be considered part of the trust corpus. Insofar as
the subject properties are public streets, sidewalks, and parks, the case for
inclusion in the public trust corpus has substantial precedential support.
421

See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817–18 (2010) (urging deference to the legislative judgment that
the property be sold in order to settle the establishment controversy).
422
See, e.g., Sax, supra note 415.
423
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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The origins of the public forum doctrine lie in dictum from Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, which explicitly invokes the concept of
the public trust: “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”424 All members of the
community are entitled to enjoy this portion of the trust corpus on equal
terms, not as special beneficiaries of governmental privatization or publicization.425
The public forum trust is far too narrow to encompass all of the properties and resources in the proposed trust corpus. For example, it would not
have included many of the properties, such as public schools, restaurants,
and swimming pools, used for settlement-by-disposition during the civil
rights era. Nor would it include certain public parklands, such as the parcel
at issue in Salazar v. Buono, that have not traditionally been used for expressive purposes. Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the public forum
trust requires any sort of preservation of trust resources. At most, it seems
to require that, in certain existing public places, the government make some
opportunities for speech and assembly available. The public forum trust
thus provides only limited support for the public trust model I am proposing.
The trust corpus must be somewhat broader than the traditional public
forum category. The general public trust doctrine has been interpreted to
limit the government’s ability to dispose of a variety of critical public resources including coastal and other public lands.426 These resources are
shared in common by the public and are often scarce. A broader notion of
trust resources as constitutional assets should apply in considerations of settlement-by-disposition. Since the civil rights era, the properties that have
been disposed of in order to settle constitutional claims and concerns have
been scarce constitutional resources. Integrated or soon-to-be-integrated
facilities, public parklands, streets, and sidewalks all ought to be considered
common but scarce public resources subject to certain limits on alienability.
Disposition of these properties substantially affects the public’s rights to

424

307 U.S. 496, 515 (1937) (emphasis added).
Although reliance on streets and parks for expression has declined, these properties remain critically important to public contention, self-government, and self-actualization. See ZICK, supra note 3
(arguing that public places such as streets and parks remain important as fora for the exercise of First
Amendment liberties, despite a modern reliance on other expressive outlets). As Justice Kennedy has
emphasized, privatization in particular poses a grave threat to the public square and to public expression.
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 695–700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining the need to preserve public properties for speech and assembly).
426
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 640–41 (1986); see also id. at 649–50
(noting that public trust doctrine has been applied to rural parklands and downtown areas).
425
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access, use, and enjoy common resources that are critically linked to various constitutional liberties.
Similarly, properties that are taken or purchased by governments may
become part of or alter the existing trust corpus. The Mt. Soledad taking
and the purchase of private speech in Summum are examples.427 Again, the
purchase or taking itself may be legally authorized. Nevertheless, as explained in the remainder of this section, certain pre- and post-disposition
duties may apply to properties that are held in common for the benefit of
the public. To be sure, there are some built-in limits on governmental property acquisitions. For example, the government’s power to take private
property is restricted by the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause.428
But minimal requirements of due process and the liability rule requiring
payment of just compensation may not be adequate public safeguards.
These limitations do not necessarily prevent collusive and sham dispositions. Further, while they provide some protection to property owners, due
process and eminent domain limits may fail to protect both the rights of minority objectors and the public at large from the effects of property dispositions. In sum, it is appropriate to consider certain acquired parcels as part
of the trust corpus and thus subject to the proposed trust duties.
Limiting the government’s power to dispose of certain public properties will not entail invasive judicial or other inroads on generally discretionary allocative authority. In many cases, compliance with the basic
procedures applicable to disposition of public properties will satisfy any legal and constitutional requirements. With respect to critical constitutional
assets, however, additional duties ought to apply.
2. The Duty of Fair Dealing.—Under the proposed public trust approach, the most basic of the proposed public trust duties is the duty to engage in fair dealing with regard to the subject property. At a minimum, of
course, any disposition must have a legitimate public purpose. However,
contrary to the formalist approach taken by some courts, this means more
than compliance with federal, state, and local laws relating to property disposition. The mere passage of legal title does not satisfy the proposed duty
of fair dealing. The disposition must be executed for a legitimate and nondiscriminatory purpose.
Although courts did not use these terms, one could regard the history
of settlement-by-disposition during the civil rights era as indicating an effort by some courts to impose such a duty. State and local officials frequently disposed of the trust corpus in a manner that breached what I call
the duty of fair dealing through various attempts to evade equality guarantees. As discussed in Part I, during the 1950s and 1960s some courts became acutely aware that seemingly innocuous and routine property
427
428

See supra notes 285–306, 406–13 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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dispositions were not as they seemed on the surface. Over time, the courts
received an invaluable education regarding the various forms and tactics
used to achieve circumvention-by-disposition. As judges gained experience, some became highly skeptical of the legitimacy of property disposition as a means of settling Fourteenth Amendment concerns. Judge
Wisdom voiced this judicial frustration when he stated that “in the sector of
the law encompassed in the subject ‘Civil Rights’, case by case federal
courts have acquired a thorough education in ‘Sophisticated Circumvention.’”429
As discussed in Part I, however, there were limits to this judicial skepticism. Not all courts were willing to look behind or second-guess property
dispositions. Even the Supreme Court, the very source of Brown’s national
integration directive, upheld some very questionable dispositions. Although seemingly disheartened by the result, the Abney Court upheld the
city’s divestment and permitted Baconsfield to revert to Senator Bacon’s
heirs, even though that meant the closure of the park rather than its integration.430 In Palmer, the Court ultimately deferred to local officials’ economic
and “public safety” justifications in allowing the closure of the city’s public
pools, even though the effect was circumvention of a pending integration
order.431 Still, in many cases, especially those involving the integration of
schools, lower courts often prevented circumvention-by-disposition by insisting on fair dealing and a measure of public accountability.432
Public officials have continued to dispose of the trust corpus in ways
that suggest circumvention of rather than compliance with constitutional
guarantees. Yet in many cases contemporary property dispositions have not
been viewed with serious skepticism. Today a duty of fair dealing, insofar
as it applies in some form, appears to be satisfied so long as no “unusual
circumstances”433 are present. As the Buono plurality opinion suggested,
courts are still reluctant to look behind property dispositions.434 In some
cases, so long as the dispositions have satisfied private law requirements for
land transfers, they have been deemed valid.435 Indeed, as Buono suggests,

429
430
431
432
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United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 5 (1963).
See supra notes 42–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137–44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64–76, 80–103 and accompanying text.
See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.

2000).
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See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817–18 (2010) (noting that the land-transfer enactment “embodie[d] Congress’s legislative judgment that this dispute is best resolved through a framework and policy of accommodation” and that the district court should not have dismissed that judgment lightly).
435
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 341.
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there appears to be a working presumption of fair dealing on the part of
public officials.436
Civil rights era courts were of course reacting to more than two decades of attempted nullification and circumvention-by-disposition. Nothing
we have seen in the First Amendment or any other context quite compares
with this attempted violation of the public trust. Nevertheless, the fundamental reasons for skepticism, including the possibility of circumvention
and government manipulation of the trust corpus, certainly remain present
today.437
Thus, at a minimum, a “bona fide” property disposition is generally
one that complies with all applicable land disposition laws, involves the fair
solicitation of bids from the public, and is effectuated for fair market value
or just compensation. Dispositions must be bona fide in the most elementary sense that the process of disposition is lawful and legitimate. However,
this basic legal formality is merely a minimum requirement, not the full extent of the proposed duty of fair dealing.
Courts ought to scrutinize more carefully the underlying basis for governmental action when public trust values are at stake. In particular, they
ought to ensure that the disposition is being executed for a valid public purpose. Although courts have not always treated them as such, we have encountered a host of indicators in disposition cases that might suggest a
breach of the duty of fair dealing. For example, dispositions executed just
prior to or in response to judicial orders requiring integration or removal of
a public religious display may suggest an improper purpose. Where the extensive history relating to a disposition suggests a collusive effort to preserve a religious symbol, there is a basis for requiring a very clear secular
justification for it. Similarly, where a disposition preserves access for only
a select few speakers it might be considered presumptively violative of the
duty of fair dealing. Even the deferential standard applied in ordinary takings cases arguably ought to be ratcheted up where a government intervenes
for the specific purpose, or with the ultimate effect, of rescuing or preserving a purely sectarian symbol. Although the foregoing circumstances
would not necessarily require rescission of the transaction, they would certainly justify further judicial inquiry.
Some might object that the proposed duty of fair dealing would embroil courts in difficult questions of governmental purpose and motive.
They might suggest that courts ought to limit review solely to the disposition instruments and other objective facts. Purpose or motive review indeed

436

See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (criticizing the district court for failing to acknowledge that “Congress’s prerogative to balance opposing interests and its institutional competence to
do so provide one of the principal reasons for deference to its policy determinations”).
437
See, e.g., id. at 1837 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the purpose of the land transfer statute
was to preserve the cross, a religious symbol, on privatized land).
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has long been controversial.438 However, a few examples will demonstrate
why such an inquiry is sometimes necessary to determine whether officials
have complied with the duty of fair dealing.
Suppose, for example, that a state legislature, having been ordered by a
court to remove a Latin cross from its capitol, enters an agreement to sell
the small portion of the capitol building upon which the cross presently sits
to a private party. The legislature stands ready to erect a plaque indicating
that the cross is privately owned and does not constitute an endorsement of
any religion or religious message by the state. Assume further that the sale
complies with state laws and is the product of an open and fair bidding
process. Although the transaction appears to be legally bona fide, there is
ample reason in such a case to suspect that the object of this transaction, as
well as its effect, is to preserve and endorse a religious message in a critical
democratic space.439
Similarly, recall the vacation of public access to the cul-de-sac in front
of the abortion clinic in Thomason.440 There was no indication in that case
that local regulations relating to land disposition had not been followed to
the letter. Surely, though, that does not mean the judicial inquiry ought to
be at an end. As it turned out, officials had not in fact dealt fairly with the
cul-de-sac property. They had vacated the public’s right of access precisely
because protesters had used the property for protected First Amendment ac-

438

See Ely, supra note 145, at 1208 (“Opening skirmishes over the relevance of motivation occurred during the 1920’s and early 1930’s in cases involving the reach of federal power.”). John Hart
Ely and Paul Brest had a comprehensive debate concerning whether official motive or purpose was relevant to legislative, executive, and administrative decisions, and if so under what circumstances. See
Brest, supra note 145; Ely, supra note 144, at 1208. In situations involving generally discretionary governmental decisionmaking, including disposition of governmental resources like public properties, Ely
argued that illicit motive may require the government to present a legitimate defense of the choice made,
while Brest argued that illicit motive was sufficient grounds for invalidation. Compare Ely, supra note
145, at 1295 (arguing that “[o]rdinarily a state need provide no legitimate defense of a decision to terminate one public service rather than another, but when the choice has been made for an unconstitutional
reason, such a defense should be required”), with Brest, supra note 145, at 130–31 (arguing that courts
should invalidate otherwise constitutional decisions when they are designed in part to serve an illicit or
suspect motive, “unless the defendant comes forward with an extraordinary justification”). Enlightening
as it was, neither that debate, nor any since, has settled the matter. The problems with motive review,
including the difficulty of ascertaining motive and the futility of invalidating otherwise permissible laws
or actions on motive grounds, were apparent well before Palmer held that official motive, standing
alone, could not determine the constitutionality of the pool closures. See Brest, supra note 145, at 119–
30 (discussing purported difficulties with motive review). Despite Palmer’s admonition, motive review
remains present even in contemporary equality contexts. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1990) (holding that in challenging a voting district on equal protection grounds, the plaintiff had to
show that race was the “predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district”).
439
Cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging that government is not acting neutrally when it “giv[es] sectarian religious speech
preferential access to a forum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter)”).
440
Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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tivities.441 A narrow focus on the procedural validity of these dispositions—
i.e., whether they complied with local land use laws and regulations—
would have been wholly inadequate.
Concerns about undertaking motive or purpose inquiries in establishment cases ought not be overstated, particularly since Establishment Clause
doctrine expressly requires that courts assess official purpose.442 While
purpose review has not resulted in the invalidation of a great many enactments or governmental actions, Supreme Court precedents, particularly recent ones, provide ample support for undertaking the inquiry with an eye
toward smoking out sham explanations, transactions, and policies.443 Although the government’s characterization of a disposition as a bona fide settlement is entitled to some deference, courts ultimately have a duty to
“distinguish[] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.”444
It is thus appropriate, “where an understanding of official objective
emerges from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis
of [an official’s] heart of hearts,” to undertake an objective inquiry regarding the purpose of a sale or other disposition of public property.445 The discoverable and objective facts in disposition cases may include the retention
of a property interest by the government, continued official involvement in
the maintenance of the property after disposition, the structuring of the
transaction such that the continued display of a religious symbol is favored,
and any history of governmental efforts to ensure that a religious display is
preserved in its original state. The fact that all of these elements were present446 ought to weigh very heavily in the district court’s reconsideration of
the constitutionality of the transfer statute in Buono.
In sum, in assessing whether the government has complied with the
duty of fair dealing in Establishment Clause cases, courts ought not confine
the inquiry to the facial validity of the disposition instruments. To echo
Judge Wisdom’s observation with regard to civil rights circumvention, the
skepticism evident in some recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause
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See id. at 1201–03.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (requiring that legislation have a secular
purpose).
443
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (holding that a display of the Ten
Commandments at a county courthouse had a “predominately religious purpose” and thus violated the
Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (holding that it was
reasonable to infer that the school district’s stated purpose for allowing student-initiated prayer at football games was a sham); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 589 (1987) (holding that Louisiana’s
“Creationism Act” violated the Establishment Clause because it did not fulfill its stated secular purpose
of protecting academic freedom).
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See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 862.
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See Buono, 130 S. Ct 1803, 1813 (2010) (describing the sequence of statutes Congress passed in
order to preserve the cross memorial on privatized land).
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cases stems from courts’ having received, if not “a thorough education in
‘Sophisticated Circumvention,’”447 at least an introductory course or two.
The duty of fair dealing also limits dispositions of public forum properties such as public sidewalks, streets, and parks. Commentators generally
have agreed with the proposition, stated in Justice Kennedy’s Lee concurrence, that “[i]n some sense the government always retains authority to
close a public forum, by selling the property, changing its physical character, or changing its principal use.”448 That authority is not unbridled, however. For example, Thomason demonstrates that the duty of fair dealing
ought to incorporate the First Amendment prohibition on content discrimination,449 as well as the principle that even a content-neutral disposition may
fail to serve an important governmental purpose.450 Where the objective
facts indicate some reason to doubt that the disposition has been effected in
good faith and for a proper public purpose, courts ought to carefully scrutinize the government’s explanation for the transfer.
Ultimately, the duty of fair dealing has both procedural and substantive
components. It is necessary but not sufficient that the sale or conveyance
meets the minimum procedural standards for legal dispositions. The disposition also must have been effectuated for a proper public purpose. Because
the properties in question are constitutional assets, the duty of fair dealing
requires careful consideration of all substantive constitutional standards relating to the legitimacy of governmental purpose.
3. The Duty of Preservation.—One of the duties sometimes imposed
upon governments under a public trust framework is to preserve the trust
corpus for public enjoyment.451 As interpreted by courts, this duty has included requirements that officials consider trust concerns prior to disposing
of or altering the trust resource, engage in pre-disposition comprehensive
resource planning and cost-benefit analysis, and allow only minimal or necessary harm to trust resources.452 The preservation duty sometimes has also
included a requirement that the public have access to trust resources regard-
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United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1963).
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699–700 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1209 n.143 (1996) (“[A] government decision to bulldoze a park—thereby incidentally rendering speech
in the park impossible—would raise no First Amendment issue.”); David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway (Where Are the Public Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 401–02 (1995) (noting that officials may close a public
forum, but arguing against demotion of public forum properties to nonpublic fora); Sullivan, supra note
4, at 1460 n.193 (noting that the government retains authority to close public forum properties).
449
See Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195, 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring that content-neutral speech
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See Lazarus, supra note 426, at 652–53.
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See id. (synthesizing precedent).
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less of who holds title.453 For example, private owners of beachfront property may be required to allow public access.454
In settlement-by-disposition contexts, we might impose upon public officials a similar duty to preserve forum properties as public spaces open on
equal terms to the public. This does not mean that such properties can
never be sold, altered, closed, or otherwise alienated. It means simply that
officials’ discretion to alienate and dispose of public properties and facilities ought to be limited to some degree by preservation concerns. Sometimes courts can play a role in enforcing this duty. For the most part,
however, this is a duty that public officials must internalize and selfenforce.
A duty of preservation could be formalized in public disposition laws
and regulations. For example, prior to any disposition officials could be required to consider the effect on overall public use and enjoyment of the subject property. They could also be required to carefully—and transparently,
for example at open public meetings—balance any constitutional objections
or claims against the purposes served by the disposition. Finally, although
it would complicate their efforts to divest themselves of the property and
thereby avoid constitutional concerns, officials ought to consider recording
at least limited public access rights and perhaps retaining some interest in
the subject properties. Whatever specific form it ultimately takes, the duty
of preservation would impose some limits on officials’ power to alienate
constitutional trust resources.
Although self-imposed limits are likely to be the most effective preservation measures, courts are not powerless to enforce a duty of preservation.
During the civil rights era, courts were somewhat successful in enforcing a
preservation obligation, although they did not label it as such. For example,
some courts reviewed dispositions involving public school properties with
heightened skepticism and ultimately refused to allow certain privatizations.455 Although they did not hold that the government had a constitutional obligation to maintain or operate public schools, courts were not
blind to the fact that widespread privatization of these properties might facilitate white flight and indefinite racial segregation.456 Preservation of at
least some public school properties was deemed critical to granting equal
access to educational opportunities and to equality more generally. Similarly, although they did not hold that officials were prohibited from disposing of public golf courses, cafeterias, or other public properties, courts
453

See Saetz v. Heiser, 240 N.W.2d 67, 72 (N.D. 1976)); Lazarus, supra note 426, at 653 (citing
Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass. 1979)).
454
See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J. 1984) (holding that private nonprofit association must allow public access to beachfront property).
455
See supra notes 63–76, 80–103 and accompanying text.
456
See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973) (noting a dramatic rise in private schools in
Mississippi following desegregation orders).
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sometimes sought to preserve the public character of these properties in order to facilitate integration.457 They did this by flexibly interpreting the
state action doctrine or treating the retention of a future interest by government as a sufficient justification for imposing constitutional obligations. As
Palmer suggested, however, there are limits to judicial enforcement of any
preservation obligation.458 Neither the plurality nor the dissent in Buono
mentioned the negative effect settlement-by-disposition might have on efforts to preserve public resources.
Imposing the proposed duty of preservation could affect settlement-bydisposition in the establishment context in several ways. As noted, prior to
disposition, officials ought to carefully consider the effect that selling an
individual parcel located within a public park to a private speaker might
have on overall public use and enjoyment of the space. They ought to acknowledge publicly and transparently that establishing exclusive property
rights will remove the subject parcel from general public use. Officials
ought also to consider whether privatization will deter use by those who do
not share the religious beliefs of the new title holder. Disposal of substantial parcels may also impact speech and assembly rights in a park or other
public place. Taking or otherwise publicizing private property can produce
similar effects. Creating special enclaves through dispositions that serve
primarily private interests is fundamentally inconsistent with the proposed
duty to preserve public resources and public access. Granting what are in
essence preferred positions in public fora to selected speakers is generally
inconsistent with the proposed obligation to preserve scarce constitutional
resources. Officials should be required to carefully consider and publicly
defend the balance they have struck between disposition and public use.
Legislators did not do so in Buono, for example, where they enacted the
transfer statute “without any deliberation whatsoever.”459
Especially given the variety of other constitutionally valid options
typically available to them, officials faced with a contest over a public religious display should consider selling public properties only as a last resort—for example, where removing the religious symbol would actually
result in its physical destruction. Similarly, takings and purchases ought
generally to be reserved for dispositions intended to add to the trust corpus
and increase public use and access, rather than to rescue private messages
or take sides in local controversies regarding religious displays. Assuming
such transactions are for an otherwise valid purpose and hence satisfy the
duty of fair dealing, courts will be especially unlikely to invalidate them.
That, again, is why it is imperative that officials view themselves as trustees
of the constitutional corpus. Even if they are not inclined to write preservation limits into law, officials ought to approach disposition of constitutional
457
458
459
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assets with the same sort of care that often attends disposition of other
scarce resources. They ought to balance the need for settlement against the
harm the disposition might do to the trust resource, the limits it will place
on public liberties, and the message it will send to the community.
If after careful consideration of the costs and benefits and the effect on
public resources officials remain intent on disposition as a means of settling
establishment disputes, they ought to maximize preservation by privatizing
the smallest possible parcels. This follows from the public trust principle
that officials ought to minimize the harm to trust resources and allow for
only limited encroachments.460 Here courts can play an important role. In
particular, they should not order officials to privatize ever larger parcels of
public land to demonstrate compliance with the Establishment Clause.461 If
that is the only way to separate the state from a religious message, then removal of the symbol must be considered the only viable option. The public’s right of access to a public park or other trust resource outweighs any
interest the government may have in facilitating preservation of the private
religious speech in question.
In the speech and assembly context, the principal preservation concern
is the steady and continuing erosion of the public square. The public forum
doctrine provides that existing public streets, parks, and sidewalks are held
in trust for purposes of expressive activities. However, the Supreme Court
has never decided whether public officials have any duty to preserve even
traditional public forum spaces or whether they may be treated as disposable surplus property. Imposing a duty of preservation with regard to public parks and other forum properties raises a fundamental and unresolved
First Amendment issue. As Thomason shows, dispositions that offend the
neutrality requirement breach the proposed duty of fair dealing and are on
that basis invalid.462 Is there any basis for imposing a preservation duty
where governmental decisions to close public forum properties such as
parks and streets are based upon neutral and presumptively legitimate reasons?
Suppose, for example, that local officials want to bulldoze a public
park in order to allow a private contractor to build a housing complex on
the parcel.463 Assume the reason for the proposed disposition is purely financial; officials insist that the park has simply become too costly to maintain and that the housing complex is a far more efficient use. A group of
citizens objects that this disposition violates their speech and assembly
460

See Lazarus, supra note 426, at 652–53 (noting that some courts have required that public trustees minimize harm to trust assets and interests).
461
But see Budd, supra note 167, at 244 (“[I]f public property cannot be subdivided in a way that
effectively separates some portion of the original land from the dominating presence of a religious symbol, government’s only alternative will be to sell the entire parcel if it declines to remove the display.”).
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See supra notes 393–405 and accompanying text.
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A similar example is mentioned in Dorf, supra note 448, at 1209 n.143.
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rights, and officials insist that the disposition extinguishes any such claims.
One might argue that the First Amendment does not apply to such a disposition. After all, this is not a situation in which government has regulated
speech or assembly directly, regulated expression in an existing public forum, or discriminated against particular speakers or messages.464
Yet even this incidental burden on speech and assembly may merit
some First Amendment scrutiny.465 The assumption in the hypothetical is
that people will be able to assemble and engage in speech elsewhere.466 But
that assumption may well be false. The public forum doctrine takes a very
narrow view of which properties constitute traditional public fora and gives
officials broad discretion to decide whether to create designated fora for
speech and assembly.467 Moreover, privatization, audience mobility, public
policing, and other forces make it even less likely that speech and assembly
can or will simply be relocated to some other public space. The destruction
of an entire public park may thus constitute a rather substantial burden on
public speech and assembly rights. This is particularly likely to be the case
in a locale that does not have ample and adequate alternative venues for
such activities. Before a property that traditionally has been available for
purposes of public speech and assembly is destroyed, First Amendment
concerns ought to lead public officials to carefully consider the preservation
implications of such a disposition.468
Courts likely would play only a very limited role in reviewing such
dispositions. A duty of preservation rooted in First Amendment concerns
does not entail locking officials into public properties and facilities for all
time. For example, a local decision to bulldoze a traditional public forum
on the facts suggested above likely would be upheld under the First
Amendment. The government’s objective—to preserve scarce budgetary
resources and use the parcel in the most efficient manner—likely would be
deemed important under the circumstances. The destruction would be content-neutral, and there would be no claim of unequal or discriminatory access in such a case.
Nevertheless, application of the First Amendment might at least require that officials explain what post-disposition alternatives for public
speech and assembly would be available in the community. In the unlikely
event that there essentially would be no place for such activities, the pro464

Cf. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment
does not apply to the imposition of a general public health regulation to an adult bookstore where no expressive activity was actually burdened).
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See Dorf, supra note 448, at 1209 n.143 (noting that the seeming absence of a First Amendment
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See id.
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See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 439, 448–51 (2006) (describing and critiquing public forum’s categorical approach).
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See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939).
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posed disposition might indeed implicate the First Amendment.469 In such a
case, it might be appropriate for a court to either idle the bulldozer or at
least insist that officials consider providing alternative fora.
Preservation concerns were at least implicit in some of the public forum disposition cases discussed in Part III. Some courts noted specifically
that privatization has diminished opportunities for speech and assembly, especially in urban areas.470 In the Venetian and LDS cases, the courts analyzed whether replacement of the public sidewalk and sale of the public
plaza, respectively, had so transformed the properties that they could no
longer be deemed public spaces.471 By geographic happenstance, indefinite
preservation appeared to be the result in the Venetian case. The replacement sidewalk in front of the casino was actually built into the local pedestrian grid.472 Since the parcel continued to function as a public sidewalk
even after disposition, the court held that the First Amendment continued to
apply to the subject property.473
In the LDS case, by contrast, the city was ultimately able to avoid its
preservation obligations. Compliance with the duty of preservation would
have required public maintenance of (at least) the small public easement the
city had retained after the first sale. The Tenth Circuit did not impose this
obligation on the city.474 As in the bulldozed-park hypothetical, the court
ought to have at least inquired about post-disposition alternatives to the privatized portion of Main Street. Again, whether or not the First Amendment
required this result, city officials ought to have taken it upon themselves to
preserve the public easement rather than to sell the entire parcel to the LDS
church. As a result of the sale of the last piece of what once was a municipal thoroughfare, the public’s right of access was completely extinguished.
Today, the LDS Church determines, by virtue of the trespass laws, who
may speak and assemble on Main Street Plaza.475
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See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 35–36 (1993) (suggesting that a shopping center owner’s decision to exclude political protesters “from the only place in
town where people convene and are available to read and listen” may abridge First Amendment liberties
of speakers).
470
See, e.g., First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002).
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See id.; Venetian Casino Resort L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 941, 948
(9th Cir. 2001).
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Venetian Casino, 257 F.3d at 939–40.
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See id. at 948.
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See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the sale of an easement to a private entity extinguished its public forum character).
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See supra note 283 and accompanying text. Perhaps one way to achieve public preservation
here would be for courts to hold that LDS’s invocation of judicial power to enforce state trespass laws
implicates state action subject to First Amendment review. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1696 (2009) (“Every time
the civil liability system is used for enforcement, the power of the state is invoked, and state action exists.”).
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The proposed duty of preservation, like the duty of fair dealing, does
not forbid the sale or other disposition of public properties. It requires,
however, that officials and courts address preservation concerns when engaging in or reviewing settlement-by-disposition. This may result in fewer
or at least more carefully considered dispositions, the privatization of
smaller parcels, and some consideration by officials regarding whether alternative fora are available for speech and assembly activities after disposition. In short, imposing a duty of preservation may prevent at least some
impairment of constitutional trust resources.
4. The Duty to Comply with Constitutional Covenants.—Even if a
disposition satisfies the duties of fair dealing and preservation, it does not
necessarily settle all constitutional concerns regarding a trust property. Owing to the close nexus between the subject properties and constitutional liberties, the public trust may impose certain post-disposition duties on
government and its successors-in-interest. Specifically, the alienation must
not have the effect of violating any constitutional covenants that attach to
and run with the property.
In the 1950s and 1960s, circumvention-by-disposition was premised on
the basic notion that Fourteenth Amendment obligations did not attach to
the subject properties and run with them through disposition. Officials
seem to have believed that the equal protection guarantee could simply be
leased, devised, or deeded away along with the property. As we saw, however, simple leases were deemed insufficient to extinguish Fourteenth
Amendment obligations even where the government was only minimally
involved as a lessor.476 Moreover, some courts were willing to apply the
state action doctrine flexibly in order to impose equal access requirements
on properties that appeared to have been legally privatized.477 The retention
of any interest, no matter how minor, was sometimes considered an adequate basis for imposing constitutional duties on purchasers or devisees.478
Further, if the sale or other conveyance had the post-disposition effect of interfering with school integration, or continuing segregation in public facilities, the courts sometimes rescinded the transaction.479 In a figurative sense,
then, courts at times were willing to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as a
covenant that attached to and ran with the subject properties. Mere transfer
of title or possession did not extinguish the constitutional covenant of
equality. Officials had to either operate the properties or facilities them476

See supra Part I.C.
See supra notes 107–25 and accompanying text. Doctrinal stretching of this sort was not uncommon, especially in the school desegregation context. See KLARMAN, supra note 133, at 342–43 (describing changes to constitutional doctrine following massive resistance to desegregation).
478
See Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1962) (relying upon the existence of a public reversionary interest to impose an obligation on private owners to provide nondiscriminatory access to a golf course).
479
See, e.g., Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1971).
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selves or ensure that any private transferee complied with constitutional requirements.
In contemporary establishment cases, courts have sometimes taken
steps to impose a duty to comply with constitutional covenants. In Marshfield, for example, the court properly identified the two separate issues that
must be addressed to determine whether a property disposition settles an
Establishment Clause claim.480 The first is whether the disposition itself
constitutes an establishment of religion.481 That question is encompassed
within the duty of fair dealing and, more specifically, the consideration of
official purpose. The second is whether the property disposition has actually cured the constitutional violation associated with the display.482 This
inquiry, which relates to the effect of the disposition rather than its purpose,
requires that courts examine the post-disposition property for compliance
with the Establishment Clause. In this sense, the Establishment Clause
covenant effectively attaches to the property regardless of formal privatization.
In the establishment context, governments have a duty to ensure that
the disposition has actually settled any endorsement concerns. This constitutional covenant is based on the premise that governments have not only a
negative duty under the Establishment Clause to avoid religious preference
or endorsement, but also an affirmative obligation to ensure that their actions are not ultimately perceived as favoring religion.483 In establishment
terms, courts must assess whether a reasonable observer would still perceive, based on the physical characteristics and location of the privatized
property, that government was favoring or preferring religion. They must
also determine whether any restrictions intended to resolve Establishment
Clause concerns give rise to new free speech concerns. These postdisposition inquiries must be made whether the disposition takes the form
of privatization or publicization. In this sense, the Establishment Clause
does not simply disappear upon transfer of title. Moreover, although a postdisposition endorsement does not “forever taint” the subject property,484 the
government has a continuing obligation to demonstrate that physical and
other alterations to the property have extinguished any official endorsement
of religion. In essence, then, there is a continuing duty to comply with the
establishment covenant.

480

Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Buono might be read as casting
some doubt on the very notion of constitutional covenants. As noted earlier, Justice Kennedy questioned whether the reasonable observer test even
applied to privatized properties like the “donut hole” in the Mojave.485 This
merely demonstrates why compliance with a duty of fair dealing is necessary but not sufficient. Even if the purpose of the transfer statute was legitimate and secular, the effect of the transfer may still be a continuing
governmental endorsement of religion. The anti-establishment covenant
operates as an additional check on settlement-by-disposition. As Justice
Stevens noted in his Buono dissent, where the issue presented is whether the
disposition cures an existing Establishment Clause violation, it is particularly appropriate to inquire whether the disposition itself removes the perception of official endorsement of religion.486
In the speech and assembly context, some courts have imposed obligations on the government and its successors to comply with free speech and
assembly covenants. Thus even after title passes to private owners, insofar
as the property conveys subject to rights of public access or continues to
function as a public forum its owners or possessors must continue to comply with constitutional commands. In the Venetian and LDS cases, the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits imposed this duty by applying a functional postdisposition standard. As the court said in the LDS case, which initially involved retention of a public easement across a privatized plaza, “a deed
does not insulate government action from constitutional review.”487 An
easement or other parcel that functions as a public forum should be treated
as one, these courts properly held, regardless of the attempted privatization.
Thus, like the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech and Free Assembly
Clauses attach to public forum properties and follow them through disposition. As the LDS case showed, the speech and assembly covenants do not
apply in perpetuity. Rather, they attach to the subject properties until their
uses and physical characteristics indicate they are no longer functioning as
public fora.488
The duty to comply with constitutional covenants has been unevenly
and indeed somewhat weakly enforced. As noted in Parts I and II, not all
courts have adopted and applied the functional approach. Some have fo485

Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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cused narrowly on the disposition instrument and refused to impose any
post-disposition obligations at all. Moreover, as noted, the plurality opinion
in Buono casts some doubt on the post-disposition application of the endorsement test.489 Recent cases have also backtracked from the civil rights
era principle that mere retention of a reversionary interest may be sufficient
to activate a constitutional covenant.490 Even courts that apply a functional
approach in disposition cases sometimes impose only minimal, largely superficial requirements—posting small signs or erecting fences—to satisfy
continuing covenants.491 Thus, minor aesthetic alterations may be sufficient
to extinguish First Amendment obligations. For example, Main Street
Plaza in Salt Lake City is still quite capable of functioning as a public forum. However, because the courts accepted the argument that landscape alterations and signage indicating that the space is now “private” property
extinguished First Amendment covenants, the church may now exclude
public speakers.492 As applied, the functional standard often seems to allow
governments both to enjoy the financial benefits of property dispositions
and to avoid their constitutional obligations to allow public speech and assembly.
Imposition of post-disposition constitutional obligations would acknowledge that the passage of title or possession does not insulate a disposition from constitutional scrutiny. To some extent, then, First Amendment
and other constitutional covenants ought to be deemed to run with the subject property. The challenge for courts is to ensure that these covenants are
meaningfully enforced such that officials cannot simply walk away once the
deed is done. The challenge for officials is to resist the temptation to reap
the benefits of disposition while shirking their constitutional duties.
5. Remedial Issues.—Whether judicially enforced or voluntarily undertaken, the foregoing public trust duties would constrain officials’ ability
to alienate critical and scarce constitutional assets. In the event of a breach,
we must consider what remedies are available. There are three principal
remedies for breach of the public trust duties with regard to settlement-bydisposition. The first and most obvious is political. Voters who disagree
with the disposition choices of their representatives may vote them out of
office or lobby for a change in policy. This political remedy is not likely to
be effective in disposition cases where title has already changed hands.493
489
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Nor is it likely to result in resale of properties taken to settle constitutional
claims. A strong political reaction might lead, however, to a general change
in policy regarding fair dealing, public property preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants.
The two other principal remedies—rescission of the disposition and
application of constitutional standards to post-disposition properties—are
judicial in nature. Here, again, there are some lessons from the civil rights
era. As noted earlier, where a disposition was effectuated with knowledge
that it would lead to segregation, courts were more likely to order rescission. In other circumstances, though, courts were reluctant to rescind the
sale, even though it had not completely dissolved the equal protection claim
or controversy. For example, in McNeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that
the appropriate remedy in a case involving the good faith sale of a public
school property to a private segregated academy was not rescission of the
sale but a requirement that the private academy admit students without regard to race.494
Where a court determines that the duty of fair dealing has been
breached, an injunction rescinding the sale is the most appropriate remedy.
Were the result otherwise, the establishment prohibition and free speech
and assembly guarantees effectively could be nullified by the mere disposition of public property. The private purchaser cannot be heard to complain,
with regard to either her property or speech rights. The sale has been rescinded on constitutional grounds, thus rendering it a nullity. Similarly, in
the takings context, should a court determine that a property has been taken
for an invalid discriminatory purpose, the taking must be invalidated. Finally, in the rare case in which a disposition destroys the only public forum
available in a community, the disposition may either be rescinded or altered
to provide for alternative public forum space.
However, where a court has determined that the disposition of public
property is not a sham and does not violate the duty of preservation, rescission is not an appropriate remedy. Courts must take into account the significant property and speech rights of the private owner, who has now taken
possession pursuant to a bona fide transaction. They must also consider the
detrimental effects that would follow from rescission, including harms associated with possible destruction of religious symbols and the expectation
interests of the parties.495 As in McNeal, the only appropriate remedy in
such cases is to enforce against the private owner the duty to comply with
applicable constitutional covenants. In First Amendment contexts, the private owner must alter the property such that a reasonable observer will not
perceive endorsement or the property will no longer be capable of functioning as a public forum.
494
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C. Constitutional Settlements
Ultimately, the point of imposing public trust duties on public officials
is to ensure that they enter constitutional settlements. As the discussion indicates, the proposed duties are based upon and subsume various constitutional obligations. In general, constitutional settlements must serve a public
trust purpose, comply with both the letter and spirit of judicial orders and
decrees relating to the subject properties, and respect minority rights. These
limits obviously go beyond the basic procedural and democratic requirements for ordinary property dispositions. As I hope to have explained in
this Article, the dispositions at issue are in no sense ordinary.
A constitutional settlement must be distinguished from a purely majoritarian solution or a political settlement that is based upon special constituents’ interests or discriminatory community attitudes. For example, one
proposal for settling constitutional contests relating to public properties is to
put the decision whether to sell the subject property to a public referendum.496 Imagine that such a referendum had been placed before a small
Southern community in the 1960s after a judge had entered a desegregation
order, the question on the ballot being whether to sell the local public
school to a private entity that happens to be segregated. Similarly, in a
community committed to public expressions of faith, imagine putting a proposed disposition of public park property upon which a cross rests to a referendum after a court has ordered that the display violates the
Establishment Clause and must be removed. Finally, suppose the question
posed in the LDS Main Street case—whether a public easement for speech
and assembly ought to be retained by the city—had been put to a direct vote
of the people. The process in these situations would certainly be democratic. The problem, however, is that the process ignores public trust considerations and is sometimes based upon strategies for overturning judicial
determinations regarding constitutional requirements, thereby providing little or no protection for the constitutional rights of minorities.
During the civil rights era, some lower courts rightly seemed skeptical
that property dispositions that occurred close in time to the entry of a desegregation order and involved public school properties could constitute legitimate constitutional settlements. Outside the schools context, however,
the Supreme Court and other courts seemed to have a more ambivalent
view. They tolerated dispositions that were almost certainly based upon
constituents’ racial attitudes and their general objection to integration, and
that seemed designed to thwart judicial desegregation decrees that communities found unacceptable.497 A democratic settlement can give voice and
496
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effect to such public attitudes, but a constitutional settlement cannot. Property dispositions ought to be based on a thorough consideration of constitutional interests rather than on political pressure or legislative expediency.
Contemporary courts have also upheld or otherwise signaled approval
for what seem in some cases to be purely democratic or political, as opposed to constitutional, settlements. In Buono, for example, the plurality
urged deference to a land transfer measure buried in an appropriations bill
and apparently “undertaken without any deliberation whatsoever.”498 The
plurality did not explain why deference to Congress’s political determination, as opposed to its considered constitutional judgment, was appropriate.
Particularly in the religious symbols context but in others as well, there
seems to be a type of fight-to-the-death mentality. Displays are blocked by
judicial decrees, which in turn are countered by property dispositions,
which in turn are reviewed for constitutionality. As Buono shows, multiple
enactments may be required to preserve a single religious symbol499—one
the legislature assures us has only secular import.500 When all else has
failed, the broad powers of Congress have been relied upon to settle matters
by selling or taking properties.
There is something dubious, perhaps even unseemly, about this process. Officials obviously are entitled to defend allocations and dispositions
of contested public properties. They can, for example, insist that a religious
symbol be displayed on public land and may defend that display in court as
being constitutional. Once they have lost that battle, however, one may legitimately question whether officials ought to stubbornly persist by turning
to private-law-based transactions.
A constitutional settlement ought to convey the impression and convince the political community that officials have taken constitutional obligations seriously. Is that the impression conveyed by the creation of
veritable donut holes in public parks, the taking by the federal government
of properties at the center of local constitutional contests, or the conveyance
in fee simple of portions of Main Street? The constitutional lessons for
both the losers of these contests and the public at large may be: (1) that their
public liberties are largely if not wholly discretionary in the sense that they
can be terminated by disposition, and (2) that public officials are empowered to sell or otherwise dispose of the corpus of the public trust to advance
the private interests of certain speakers or faiths.
Officials sometimes have claimed that selling or taking public property
quells constitutional controversy. For example, when Congress took the
Mt. Soledad property on which a Latin cross is presently located, it claimed
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to do so in part to settle an intractable local controversy.501 Similarly, when
Salt Lake City officials sold the remaining easement on what used to be a
portion of Main Street, they claimed to do so in part to “reduce the public
outcry” that followed its joint ownership of the parcel with the LDS
Church.502 In Buono, the plurality characterized Congress’s decision to enact the land transfer statute as intended to avoid offending those who believe the Latin cross represents a legitimate aspect of the country’s religious
heritage.503 This controversy-avoidance justification has gained legitimacy
in Establishment Clause cases, particularly as a result of Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion in Van Orden v. Perry.504 Van Orden upheld the display
of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.505
One of Justice Breyer’s justifications for upholding the display was a concern that a contrary ruling “might well encourage disputes concerning the
removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public
buildings across the Nation[, and] . . . thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”506
Quelling controversy is not an illegitimate goal, of course. For example, as noted earlier, serious concerns may arise from injunctive relief that
essentially requires the destruction of a religious symbol.507 However, settlement-by-disposition cannot generally be justified on the ground that it
quells controversy or reduces divisiveness. For example, the maintenance
of a religious symbol may reduce offense to some believers. However, “it
does not follow that the government can decline to cure an Establishment
Clause violation in order to avoid offense.”508 Moreover, some property
dispositions may actually encourage controversy. For example, privatization of properties on which religious symbols are located may violate the
free speech rights of private speakers. Other speakers may bring access
claims of their own, insisting that officials privatize additional public properties to sanction their religious or other messages. Similarly, publicization
of private religious symbols may settle free speech claims while at the same
time giving rise to establishment concerns. It is not entirely clear that dis501
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positions settle even the underlying political controversy. Indeed, rather
than settle controversies, dispositions of properties that are at the center of
constitutional contests may breed public resentment and cynicism. This is
particularly true where purported settlements appear nakedly strategic or
political rather than deliberative and constitutional.
In sum, officials may in some cases be reaching democratic or political
settlements through the vehicle of property disposition. But several decades
of experience with settlement-by-disposition have shown that democratic
processes sometimes must be supplemented with measures designed to preserve public use and enjoyment of trust properties on equal terms. Ultimately, officials ought to seek and courts ought to enforce settlements that
are based upon public trust purposes, comply with judicial decrees, and respect minority constitutional rights. Some of these settlements likely will
be less politically popular; but they will be more constitutionally legitimate.
That should be the public trustee’s principal concern.
CONCLUSION
It has been clear since the civil rights era that government may not
simply turn the Constitution off at will by disposing of public properties.
As we have seen, however, the constraints on settlement-by-disposition are
rather thin and ad hoc. In general, public officials have not acted as committed trustees of the subject properties. Instead, they have disposed of
properties as if government is an ordinary owner or purchaser, and as if the
subject properties are ordinary assets akin to surplus properties.509 Neither
of these things is true. Indeed, one of the critical lessons of the civil rights
era is that governmental dispositions often have significant constitutional
implications. Public officials, and in many cases courts, have failed to internalize this critical lesson.
It at least ought to be clear that formalistic treatment of governmental
property dispositions will not adequately protect constitutional rights. The
satisfaction of private law requirements relating to title transfer does not resolve whether officials have met their public constitutional obligations.
Governmental takings and purchases ought likewise to be subject to more
rigorous constitutional scrutiny. These dispositions are hardly free of the
risk of circumvention-by-disposition.
As some courts demonstrated during the civil rights era, the judiciary
does not lack the power or means to thwart circumvention-by-disposition.
The adoption by some courts of functional approaches in First Amendment
contexts attests to at least some judicial uneasiness with settlement-bydisposition. Unfortunately, however, bits and pieces of our public square
continue to be auctioned off, conveyed, and taken as the supposed price of
509
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settling constitutional claims and concerns. The purported settlements affect not only individual complainants’ rights of use and enjoyment but also
the public’s right to enjoy access on an equal basis to a constitutional commons.
We need to rethink the nature and effect of settlement-by-disposition.
This Article has proposed a different mindset or framework with regard to
governmental disposition of properties. I have argued that public officials
and courts ought to be guided by a public trust model. Under this approach,
the decision to dispose of certain trust properties triggers duties of fair dealing, preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants. Ultimately, settlements must be constitutional in the sense that they foster a
valid trust purpose, comply with judicial orders and injunctions, and respect
minority and dissenting rights.
I recognize that this framework runs counter to the trend toward expansion of governmental control over public properties. In the 1960s, Harry
Kalven Jr. celebrated the public’s ability to “commandeer” public fora for
purposes of protest and assembly.510 Today, however, it is government that
controls such places through the public forum doctrine, an array of time,
place, and manner restrictions, and now property dispositions. I also recognize the limitations of a public trust model, including the difficulties associated with judicial enforcement of trust duties and the real-world political
pressures that often push officials in the direction of settlement-bydisposition. Without minimizing these limitations, however, the public
trust model at least refocuses the discussion of settlement-by-disposition
from purely private law concerns to a more appropriate set of public constitutional obligations. The private property paradigm has produced a vastly
diminished constitutional commons. If that trend is to continue, we ought
at least to have an honest debate regarding what is actually being allocated
or settled by disposition.
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